



Uprising Shakes IRAN REGIME'S Foundations

A Significant Step Toward Eventual Downfall





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NATIONAL COUNCIL OF RESISTANCE OF IRAN
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Table of contents

- 5 **Executive summary**

- 9 **Chapter 1 — Events on the ground**
 - Slogans
 - Impacted cities and provinces
 - Khamenei orders massive crackdown
 - Over 1,500 killed and still counting
 - People react to barbaric crackdown

- 25 **Chapter 2 — Regime’s stance on the MEK’s role in the uprising**
 - Overview
 - In their own words

- 35 **Chapter 3 — Suppression and the regime’s crimes**
 - Overview
 - Red alert mobilization and organizational chart
 - “Controlling Riots and Protests”
 - Command and Control Headquarters
 - Wireless communications reveal regime’s inability to curb protests
 - Massacre in Mahshahr

- 51 **Chapter 4 — Regime officials involved in suppression of the uprising**
 - Introduction
 - Who’s in charge?
 - Tehran Province
 - Kurdistan Province
 - Khuzestan Province
 - Kermanshah Province

- Fars Province
- Isfahan Province
- Alborz Province

69 Chapter 5 — Main takeaways of the November uprising

73 Chapter 6 — What should be done?

75 Appendix 1: Partial list of those fallen for freedom

83 Appendix 2: List of major banks and their affiliation with the Supreme Leader, the IRGC, and other regime agencies

85 List of publications

91 About the NCRI-US

Executive summary

This manuscript examines the nationwide uprising that erupted on November 15, 2019 and spread to over 180 cities in all 31 provinces of Iran. Although the unrest was sparked by a gasoline price hike, by as much as 300 percent, the protests rapidly expanded and changed focus, concentrating on the nature of the regime.

From the first day, the regime resorted to sheer violence and State Security Forces (SSF) declared a state of red alert, whereby the SSF handed over responsibility for suppressing the uprising to the IRGC, and SSF forces were put under IRGC command.

Protesters soon called for regime change by chanting “death to Khamenei,” “death to Rouhani,” and “death to dictatorship” as they confronted the repressive forces. According to the regime’s own officials, dozens of centers of repression such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Bassij, and police headquarters were attacked, after the regime started to fire live ammunition at demonstrators.

In addition, over one thousand state-run banks, mostly owned by the regime’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and the IRGC, were attacked. Iranians see these financial institutions as plunderers of their wealth and resources, whose main mission is to fund the instruments of repression inside Iran and terrorism abroad. For example, Bank Melli, the largest bank in Iran with over 3,000 branches, and Bank Mellat (owned by Khamenei’s SETAD) with over 1,600 branches, were major targets. Both have already been designated as terrorist entities by the U.S. Treasury. Khamenei, whose representative offices were also attacked by the youth, was himself sanctioned by the Treasury Department.

The regime cut off the internet on the second day to disrupt communications between protesters and prevent reports of the scale and intensity of the uprising, as well as of the atrocities committed by the IRGC and SSF from getting to the outside world. The shutdown lasted for several days before service was partially resumed in some areas.

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The Iranian regime confronted the growing protests with bullets, using both snipers and in many cases shooting protesters at point-blank range. It deployed its multitude of repressive agencies and capabilities. Consequently, the latest casualty figures as of the publication of this report exceed 1,500 dead, nearly half of whom have been identified by the Iranian Resistance. Over 4,000 were wounded and at least 12,000 arrested in some 190 towns and cities.

The resistance has also identified 92 of the officials who had leading roles in the violent murder and detention of protesters in the seven provinces which were the scenes of the most significant, widespread, and pervasive protests.

The book also highlights the role of the main Iranian opposition movement, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and their Resistance units and councils, as conceded by many major regime officials.

The key characteristics of the nationwide uprising which, by all indications, has shaken the regime to its foundations are:

1. The uprising showed that overthrow of the regime is attainable, as the public targeted the main symbols of repression, theft, and corruption.

2. The people consider the regime and all its factions as illegitimate. Iranians are ready to pay the price to unseat the ayatollahs.
3. The utter weakness of the regime, manifested by its barbaric and rampant use of brute force as well as its shutting down of the internet, was on display.
4. The gains of the uprising are irreversible; no matter how deep or wide the state suppression, the unrest will persist.
5. The role of the organized opposition exemplified by the Resistance units and councils formed by the MEK was key and will continue until the regime is brought down.

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The Iranian Resistance has called on the international community to take the following measures:

- ☉ The slaughter of protesters is a clear case of a crime against humanity. Therefore, the United Nations Security Council, and governments should take urgent action to halt the killings and suppression and secure the release of political prisoners.
- ☉ Investigative missions must be sent to Iran to evaluate the scope of the crimes and examine the cases of those killed, wounded and/or detained.
- ☉ The leaders of the regime, e.g., Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani, must be held accountable for crimes against humanity.

- ☑ The United States should sanction Western companies that aid the Iranian regime with the sale and provision of services and products that enable it to monitor, control, and block internet access by Iranian citizens. While adopting all measures necessary to diminish and disable the regime's capacity to block internet traffic, the United States should provide safe, secure, and uninterrupted internet access to Iran's people, including the protesters.
- ☑ It is time for the world to recognize the right of the Iranian people to change the repressive regime and establish a democratic, pluralistic and non-nuclear republic based on separation of religion and state.

Chapter 1

Events on the ground

Background

The flames of the recent Iran uprising were initially lit on November 15, 2019, after the sudden tripling of gasoline prices. At first, people in several cities chanted slogans against the fuel price hike. For example, in the city of Behbahan (Khuzestan Province), “gasoline becomes more expensive, the poor become poorer” was among the first slogans. In Ahvaz (also in Khuzestan Province), protestors chanted “honorable Ahvazi, turn off your car.” It did not take long, however, for the slogans to morph into calls for rejection of the regime in its entirety. In subsequent hours, gasoline-related slogans took on a secondary role, and instead people chanted slogans against the regime’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and President, Hassan Rouhani, while attacking centers of suppression, theft, and particularly those affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This report offers an overview of the developments that unfolded during the November 2019 uprising.



Scenes of the November 2019 uprising across Iran

Slogans

Some of the slogans chanted on the first day of the uprising were against increases in gasoline prices, including “I will no longer buy gasoline” or “Oil revenues are lost, spent on Palestine.” Most of the slogans, however, had political overtones, such as “Rouhani, resign, resign” and “An Iranian will die but never accept humiliation,” which was heard in the northeastern city of Mashhad.

From the second day onwards, the following slogans were chanted:

- ☑ “Death to Khamenei”
- ☑ “Death to dictator”
- ☑ “Death to Rouhani”
- ☑ “Our enemy is right here; they lie when they say it’s America”
- ☑ “Our idiot leader is a source of shame”
- ☑ “Death to Bassiji”
- ☑ “Dictator, shame on you, let go of the country”



The graffiti reads: Death to Khamenei

- ☑ “Rouhani, shame on you, let go of the country”
- ☑ “Canons, tanks, flames, mullahs must be killed”
- ☑ “Leave Syria alone; think about us instead”
- ☑ “Not Gaza, nor Lebanon, I will sacrifice my life for Iran”
- ☑ “Iranians, enough is enough; show your dignity”
- ☑ “Imprisoned university students must be freed”
- ☑ “Don’t be afraid, don’t be afraid; we are all together”
- ☑ “The pressures are breaking our backs, but we will overcome”
- ☑ “Rouhani, shame on you, hands out of our pockets”
- ☑ “We’ve shed tears of blood for forty years; it’s enough, we will stand up”
- ☑ “Enough slavery! our people have had it”

As manifested in these slogans, there was no doubt that protestors were demanding the elimination of the regime and its core pillars.

Impacted cities and provinces

The protests began in cities across Khuzestan Province in the west. They quickly spread to dozens of other municipalities in all of Iran's provinces. Major cities that saw extensive protests and clashes include: Tehran, Karaj, Shahriar, Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, Ardebil, Orumiyyeh, Rasht, Sari, Babol, Kermanshah, Javanroud, Kamyaran, Sanandaj, Neyshabour, Saveh, Birjand, Nourabad Momseni, Marvdasht, Bojnourd, Andimeshk, Behshahr, Nour, Boushehr, Mahshahr, Chabahar, Gachsaran, Abadan, Behbahan, Bandar Rig, Kangan, Iranshahr, Sirjan, Khorramshahr, Marivan, Eslamabad, Gilan Gharb, Jarrahi, Koureh, Qaemshahr, Mehrshahr, Pol-e Dokhtar, Fardis (Karaj), Islamshahr, and Baharestan.

Regime officials and state-run media outlets have admitted that the uprising encompassed at least 165 cities and towns.



The map of Iran showing locations of the November 2019 uprising.

All of Iran's cities with populations of one million or more — Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan, Karaj, Shiraz, Tabriz, Ahvaz, Kermanshah and Khorramabad — were scenes of major protests and clashes.

Among the impacted cities, several saw some of the most ferocious confrontations between the people and the regime's suppressive forces. These include: Shiraz, Mahshahr, Behbahan, Isfahan, Kermanshah, Karaj, Eslamshahr, Marivan, Shahriar, Fardis, Shahrak-e Taleqan in Mahshahr, Khorramshahr, and towns in the vicinity of Tehran and Karaj.

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Khamenei orders massive crackdown

From the very first day of protests, repressive forces of the theocratic regime used lethal force and live ammunition to, per Khamenei's directive, mercilessly crackdown on protesters.

On Friday evening, November 15, 2019 when the protests erupted, the State Security Force (SSF) opened fire on a demonstration by the people of Sirjan (south-central



The regime's repressive forces firing from the rooftop of the Justice Department building of the city of Javanrood, Kermanshah Province.

Iran), killing Ruhollah Nazari-Fat'h-abad (aged 37) and wounding many protesters. The suppressive forces shot Mr. Nazari in the head at Naft (Oil) Square, outside the city's oil depot, killing him instantly. Scores of protesters were wounded, so many that local hospitals could not accommodate them. Many were hospitalized in Kerman's Seyyed Ol-Shohada hospital. Enraged residents set fire to a petrol station and clashed with SSF agents.

Numerous cases have been documented showing that the regime's repressive forces, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), had deployed snipers to fire at demonstrators from the government buildings' roof tops.

On December 6, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet issued a report stating, "Verified video footage indicates severe violence was used against protesters, including armed members of security forces shooting from the roof of a justice department building in one city, and from helicopters in another... We have also received footage which appears to show security forces shooting unarmed demonstrators from behind while they were running away, and shooting others directly in the face and vital organs – in other words shooting to kill. These are clear violations of international norms and standards on the use of force, and serious violations of human rights."

In one of the worst incidents, which took place on November 18, the High Commissioner said her Office had received information partially corroborating reports that "Iranian security forces used machine guns against protesters in Jarahi



Images captured from a harrowing film shows an SSF agent shooting a protester from close range.

“We have also received footage which appears to show security forces shooting unarmed demonstrators from behind while they were running away, and shooting others directly in the face and vital organs – in other words, shooting to kill.”

Square in Mahshahr – including against people fleeing the area and people hiding in nearby reed-beds,” killing many people.

In addition, Amnesty International said, “Extensive video footage verified and analysed by Amnesty International’s Digital Verification Corps shows security forces shooting at unarmed protesters.”

“This alarming death toll is further evidence that Iran’s security forces went on a horrific killing spree,” said Philip Luther, Research and Advocacy Director for the Middle East and North Africa at Amnesty International.

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“Harrowing testimony from eyewitnesses suggests that, almost immediately after the Iranian authorities massacred hundreds of those participating in nationwide protests, they went on to orchestrate a wide-scale clampdown designed to instil fear and prevent anyone from speaking out about what happened,” Luther added.

According to information gathered by Amnesty International, “Families of victims have been threatened and warned not to speak to the media, or to hold funeral ceremonies for their loved ones. Some families are also being forced to make extortionate payments to have the bodies of their loved ones returned to them.”

Two eyewitness accounts are most chilling. An eyewitness from Behbahan (Khuzestan Province) reporting to the MEK said, “The names of martyrs of Behbahan you have announced are all correct, but you have only named eight. More than 20 were martyred whom I myself counted, but could not take counting any more. Could not look at all those corpses. After November 18, it was no longer only their snipers shooting at protesters, they (repressive forces) just indiscriminately opened fire on people. I witnessed more than 10 protesters whose brains were scattered on the pavement.” The eyewitness added, “A protester named Alafchi (last name) was hit with a barrage of machine gun fire so bad that his leg was cut off and he then bled to death. Whoever got close to him was hit by snipers. Three protesters went toward him to pull him out, but all three were shot in the head and died.”

A staff of a medical clinic in Sadra township outside Shiraz also reported to the MEK that: “On the evening of November 16, several security agents came to the clinic and effectively took all the staff hostage, constantly threatening them with



Gorgan

Several members of the IRGC, some in plainclothes, firing at an unarmed protester in northern city of Gorgan at point blank range, while another attacking him with an axe.



Gorgan

their guns. Until 11 pm of November 17 when the last batch of killed and wounded were brought in, 29 protesters had been killed, the majority of them with gunshot wounds to their head, neck and upper body. Ninety percent of the wounded were brought in by people with their motor bikes. All wounded were laid on the cold floor in the hospital hallways. Four of the wounded later died. My estimate is that we had between 150–160 wounded, maybe more.”

On November 17, in Fardis County of Karaj (4th most populated city of Iran), the regime’s agents, using Kalashnikovs, fired at demonstrators from rooftops. The protestors used stones, sticks, and whatever tools at their disposal to confront suppressive forces and to defend themselves.

Many reports suggested that the regime resorted to deploying Afghan proxy forces called the Fatemiyoun, formed to fight the regime's proxy war in Syria, against the local population.

None of the regime's repressive measures, and even the massacre in Mahshahr, could not stop the innocent people from continuing their protest; to the contrary, the more the regime killed, the more determined the people became.

Over 1,500 killed and still counting

Due to major interruptions in internet access and the regime's near total news blackout on the scale of the crackdown, the casualty figures and other statistics representing the utter brutality of the attempt to put down the uprising are being updated regularly, sometimes more than once a day. As of December 15, 2019, the casualty reports compiled from inside Iran, mostly provided by the MEK's resistance network, are:

- ☑ Number of impacted provinces: **31** (all of Iran's provinces)
- ☑ Number of impacted towns and cities: **191**
- ☑ Number of martyrs: **over 1500**
- ☑ Number of wounded: **over 4,000**
- ☑ Number of detainees: **over 12,000**
- ☑ Number of martyrs identified to date: **504** (see Appendix 1)

In view of the enormous scale of the uprising, eventually spreading to over 190 towns and cities, and townships, and the fearful regime's scrambling to prevent its overthrow, two days after the uprising, Khamenei personally and publicly came forward to order the suppression of the protests. Rouhani immediately followed, echoing his orders to suppress the public. Other regime officials supported their comments. Thus began a wave of slaughter.

Meanwhile, the internet blackout made the flow of information extremely difficult. The French daily *Le Monde* quoted Reporters without Borders, writing:



(Left): Newly dug graves for martyrs in the western city of Marivan in Kurdistan Province.
 (Right): Brothers Mahmoud and Mehrdad Dashti Nia were shot and killed by security forces in the southwestern city of Behbahan in Khuzistan Province.

“After the internet shutdown, the threat of a bloodbath grows.” According to one report, at least 118 injured protestors were being treated at four hospitals, including Sajjad hospital, Madani hospital, and Alborz hospital in Karaj and a hospital in Shahriar.

The latest figures compiled as of December 15, 2019 by the Iranian Resistance put the number of martyrs at over 1,500, but the real figures are believed to be much higher. The martyrs are mostly young adults and teen-agers, many of them shot in the head and chest. The regime has used various ploys to conceal the actual casualty figures. In many cases, the suppressive forces did not hand over the bodies of the dead to their families and even refused taking them to the coroner’s office, and instead buried them in unknown locations.

People react to barbaric crackdown

After the regime started to fire live ammunition at demonstrators, killing and wounding many, defiant protestors reacted to the barbaric crackdown and attacked



Mellat Bank branches, whose main shareholder is Khamenei's SETAD, was a main target of protesters' wrath. The bank is designated as terrorist by the U.S. Treasury.

centers of repression such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Bassij, and police headquarters.

In addition, over 1,000 state-run banks and financial institutions owned by the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and the IRGC, were attacked. People consider these financial institutions as plunderers of their wealth whose main mission is to fund the instruments of repression in Iran and terrorism abroad.

The targeted banks listed below have been designated as terrorist entities (Specially Designated Global Terrorists or SDGT) by the U.S. Treasury. For example, Bank Melli, Iran's largest bank with 3,100 branches, and Bank Mellat (owned by Khamenei's SETAD) with over 1,500 branches, Ansar Bank (owned by the IRGC) with 1,100 branches, Parsian Bank (main beneficiaries are Khamenei's SETAD and the IRGC) with 350 branches, Tejarat Bank (main shareholders are IRGC and Khamenei's Astan-e Ghods Razavi) with 1,500 branches, Saderat Bank (IRGC a shareholder) with 2,300 branches, and Sina Bank (owned by Khamenei's

Mostazafan Foundation) with over 250 branches, are all SDGT blacklisted, and were all major targets of the protesters. Another bank attacked, Pasargad, with over 350 branches, is also sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury, and is largely owned by the IRGC.

Khamenei, whose representative offices were also attacked by the youth, was himself sanctioned by the Treasury Department, along with his offices.

Fundamentally, all of the centers that were attacked and torched were affiliated with the IRGC or the Khamenei machinery and apparatus. Chain stores linked to the IRGC, IRGC-affiliated banks, suppressive forces' vehicles, Bassij centers, offices of mullahs affiliated with Khamenei, and government buildings were among the other targets. People also destroyed or set fire to large posters of Khamenei and those of his predecessor, Khomeini.

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Statistics and figures announced by the regime itself reveal a portion of the real scope of the damages. The state-run *Iran* daily reported:

- ☉ In only three days, damages worth an equivalent of at least 7.5% of the annual proceeds from gas price hikes were inflicted;
- ☉ 180 gas stations, 450 banks in 4 cities, and 80 branches of IRGC-affiliated chain stores were damaged.

The state-run *Etemad* newspaper wrote that youth in Shiraz had set 76 banks on fire. It added that “in 4 days, \$1.5B USD in damages were inflicted on the nation’s economy.”



Bank Melli, Iran's largest bank with 3,325 branches and designated as terrorist (SDGT) by the U.S. Treasury, was a key target.



Sina Bank branches, owned by the Khamenei-affiliated Mostazafan Foundation, were extensively targeted by the protesters. Sina Bank has been designated by the U.S. Treasury as a terrorist entity.

The state-affiliated Rouydad-24 news agency said on November 21: “A knowledgeable source in the banking sector says that from November 15 to date, more than 1,000 bank branches have been damaged. Statistics regarding some of the damages are as follows: 120 Mellat Bank branches, 100 Maskan Bank branches, and 20 Pasargad Bank branches.”

On November 24, Mullah Mojtaba Zolnour, Chairman of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the regime’s Majlis, said on state-run television (Network 5): “The enemy had planned to foment this crisis in the country around the end of January or early February of next year. We are informed that what happened (gas price hike) brought that plan forward and so they hurried and stepped up their efforts to exploit the situation. The Supreme Leader put out this fire...

“Well, these people were well-trained... For example, on Sunday, November 17, we had 147 clashes just in Tehran... Throughout the country, we had 800 clashes in just one day, forcing us to divide the strength of our forces.

“Many were identified. Some arrested. One of their methods to excite the people was utilizing the killed protesters... I have to point out here that shutting down the internet following the Supreme Leader’s decision and remarks was very helpful in spoiling this pre-planned, organized scheme and wrapping up this unrest.”

Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli admitted on November 26 that: “We were engulfed in more serious crisis in five provinces. The most damages were inflicted in Mallard, Baharestan, Quds, and Islamshahr ...On Saturday, incidents and clashes erupted in 100 locations in Tehran... More than 50 law-enforcement, military, and security bases were attacked. Some 500 protesters were moving on the radio & television, but our forces thwarted them.”

Yadollah Javani, the IRGC’s Deputy for Political Affairs also acknowledged the unparalleled extent and intensity of this round of unrest in respect to the 2009 and 2018 protests. On November 29, he said: “These incidents — so widespread and so extensive — were unprecedented in the 40-year history of the Islamic Revolution. What happened in the final days of Aban (mid-November) was a

far-reaching, new phenomenon. Although we had seen similar incidents, such as attacking and torching Bassij bases, banks and government centers during the 2009 and 2018 revolts, they were nevertheless much smaller than the recent incidents. The events on Saturday and Sunday were extensive and continued in 29 provinces and hundreds of cities. Isfahan was one of the provinces where protests and clashes occurred in 110 locations. As for crowds, Isfahan came in third after Fars and Tehran provinces.”

Regime's stance on the MEK's role in the uprising

Overview

A cursory look at the statements and positions declared by the regime's leaders and state-run media clearly shows that Resistance units of the MEK were at the core of the uprising. These Resistance units were formed several years ago and have spread throughout the country since. They have a wealth of experience gained on the ground and through thousands of acts of protest.

Just two days after the onset of the uprising, the regime's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, took to the pulpit on November 17 to set the stage for a crackdown, unprecedented in barbarity, before, as later suggested by many of his officials, the protesters could bring down his regime. A main portion of his speech was dedicated to characterizing the activists, chanting "down with dictator, down with Khamenei" in

towns and cities across all 31 provinces of Iran, as “thugs” and “foreign mercenaries.” Witnessing an all-out people’s revolt unfolding right before his eyes, Khamenei, like all other dictators nearing the end, justified shedding the demonstrators’ blood by demonizing them. His desperate ploy was parroted by other regime officials, including Rouhani.

Khamenei said: “In the course of such incidents, usually thugs, spiteful individuals and unsavory people enter the scene... You see that over the past two days, the two nights and one day, in which these incidents happened, all of the world’s centers of evil have encouraged these actions against us. From the evil and wicked family of the Pahlavi dynasty to the wicked and criminal collective of the hypocrites (the regime’s derogatory reference to the Mujahedin-e Khalq, MEK), they are constantly encouraging and inviting people on social networks and elsewhere to conduct these evil acts.”

In their own words

According to the IRGC-affiliated Fars news agency, Hossein Ashtari, the Commander of State Security Forces (SSF), said: “Our investigations show that behind the scenes, anti-revolutionary organizations and the MEK led these movements. The country’s security and law enforcement entities have identified these individuals, and God willing, they will be punished for their actions at the right time.” (November 17)

The speaker of the regime’s Majlis (parliament), Ali Larijani, said: “After hearing the profound and expedient words of Your Excellency (Khamenei), members of the Majlis consider it imperative to follow the path directed by Your Excellency, and we must coordinate more in order to deprive America, the MEK and anti-revolutionary stooges the opportunity to create chaos in the country.” (Farhang Radio, November 18)

The head of the regime’s Judiciary, Ebrahim Raisi, said: “In the face of offences involving troublemakers and those affiliated with anti-revolutionary elements and infiltrators who, in line with the enemy’s desires, have targeted the security of



Protesters gathered in towns and cities in all 31 of Iran's provinces.

the people and society, please act with firmness and implement legal actions in coordination with state security and law enforcement forces.” (Mizan News Agency, November 17)

Rouhani's spokesperson, Ali Rabei, said: “The behavior of the protestors is wholly consistent with the policies of old terrorists that we had in our country (i.e. MEK). For years and through terrorist operations, they have been waiting for Iran's will to break.” (Khabar News TV, November 18)

Hossein Ashtari, the Commander of State Security Forces (SSF): “Our investigations show that behind the scenes, anti-revolutionary organizations and the MEK led these movements.”



Protesters burn trash cans for relief against tear gas used by the State Security Forces.

A member of the regime's Assembly of Experts and former Intelligence Minister, Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri, said: "The riots were not carried out by the people. The torching of the people's belongings and the destruction that happened were done by the MEK and anti-revolutionaries. People do not set fire to their own assets. The MEK was planning for riots for several months. They were quickly identified and their ranks were separated from those of the people." (Defa Press, November 18)

Sarcastically responding to Rouhani downplaying the size of the protests, Faezeh Hashemi, daughter of the regime's former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, said: "Mr. Rouhani, if the number of protestors is so low, why have you shut down the internet? What is the reason for such treatment?" (Jamaran website, November 20)

Hassan Rouhani, the regime's President, said: "It became clear that the rioters were small in numbers. However, the rioters were organized, had plans, and were armed. They were acting completely on the basis of plans designed by the region's reactionary forces, the Zionists, and Americans." (Rouhani's official website, November 20)

The spokesperson for the Majlis Presiding Board, Assadollah Abbasi, said: "Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, said at a closed-



A police station, tasked with suppressing public unrest, was targeted by the protesters.

door meeting of the Majlis that a number of individuals who provoked people in the streets had been identified. It has become clear that they are in contact with the MEK. They were some of the hoodlums of the region who got paid to create chaos.” (ILNA, November 17)

A Majlis deputy from Malayer said: “The Islamic Republic has been able to establish sustained security in Iraq and Syria. It will never succumb to the MEK’s actions. The people of Iran, who remember enormous sacrifices, will never allow the blood of the martyrs to be trampled upon and will not support their actions. Therefore, they will not align themselves with the MEK and thugs.” (Fars News Agency, November 17)

The head of the IRGC’s paramilitary Bassij force, Gholamreza Soleimani, said: “The MEK have cells (units) in our country. And in other countries, too, agents and the MEK who are tied to America damage the public’s interests.” (Tabnak website, November 18)

The state-run daily *Jomhouri Eslami* reported on November 18 that “the commander of the IRGC Fajr Corps in Fars province says that the leaders of the riots had ties to the MEK.”

Vatan-e Emrouz daily wrote: “The methods employed by the core units of the recent incidents show that these individuals were completely trained and, unlike many



Protesters prepare to confront the regime's repressive forces in the central city of Isfahan on November 16.

of the people who were surprised by the sudden jump in gasoline prices, these individuals were ready for such circumstances. The IRGC's public relations office in Alborz said in a statement that 150 of the leaders who disrupted security in the province had been identified and arrested." (November 17)

Jomhuri Eslami daily wrote in its editorial on November 20: "The scale of the destruction was so vast and the actions were carried out so professionally that it was obvious that a well-trained and well-equipped network was at work, which had financial and strong intelligence support. After the passing of two or three days, it is now clear that this assessment was correct, and the destruction and evil acts were completely organized. The rebels, in groups of several people, went to predetermined locations and were guided by a defined command center, and resorted to destruction, setting fires, provoking the people and chanting slogans that were unrelated to the rationing issue or increase in the price of fuel. They use special signs and symbols to identify each other more easily during their operations."

The IRGC's spokesperson, Ramezan Sharif, was quoted by Mehr News Agency as saying: "Rioters belonged to the MEK. The MEK has a darker track record than

the monarchists. They have a violent streak. In a recent poll, the MEK has been identified as the most hated group.” Mehr News Agency adds: “He pointed to the fact that the rioters were trained, equipped and organized by the MEK in order to plot against the country and said: “These people carry out tangible activities both in the realm of a soft war and cultural warfare, as well as in the area of inciting insecurity.” (November 20)

The IRGC-affiliated Javan newspaper wrote: “The manner in which rioters appeared on the scene shows full well that they entered through a communications network and that they were organized, equipped, coordinated, and had a well-defined and secure communications network, and conducted secret maneuvers. They used predetermined codes.” (November 19)

Khamenei’s representative in Gilan Province, Rasoul Falahati, said: “We know that you (protesters) are the children of the executed MEK members. You are the children of the MEK in exile. ... We know who you are. ... You should no longer walk the same path as your ill-fated predecessors. You should come back to the arms of the people. Repent! The Judiciary must firmly hand down the ultimate punishment

Jomhuri Eslami **daily: “The scale of the destruction was so vast and the actions were carried out so professionally that it was obvious that a well-trained and well-equipped network was at work, which had financial and strong intelligence support.”**

for the main elements of the recent riots. They are responsible for disturbing the peace.” (Baran TV, November 20)

The state-run Afkar News said on November 20: “The detainees are in some shape or form tied to the MEK and foreign elements. They received the necessary training over the last two years in order to carry out these actions.”

Khamenei’s representative in Gilan Province, Rasoul Falahati: “We know that you (protesters) are the children of the executed MEK members. You are the children of the MEK in exile.”

The IRGC-affiliated *Javan* newspaper wrote in an editorial by its editor Abdollah Ganji: “Attacks conducted against sensitive centers, including military and law enforcement centers, marked the unique feature of this episode. Attacks were carried out against dozens of police stations, IRGC and Bassij centers, using cold weapons and firearms. Several Bassij members were surrounded and killed. Therefore, the core of the attacks shows the extent of violence and coordination of the riot. ... Special roles were defined for women. They played a fundamental role both in attacking our Bassij sisters and evoking emotions among the youth. Although they did not have any casualties, the manner in which women were employed is similar to the maneuvers of women in the MEK.” (November 20)

Ali Shamkhani, Secretary for the Supreme National Security Council: “I believe 34 MEK members have been arrested so far. A vast network of individuals, operating not under the MEK’s name, but pursuing their line and modus operandi, were also identified.” (Defa’ Press, November 24)



Protesters set a billboard with images of Khomeini and Khamenei on fire during the November 2019 uprising.

Ebrahim Raisi, the Judiciary Chief: “The same people, who exploited the public’s state of anxiety and demands in order to incite riots and insecurity, and their masters should know that severe punishment awaits them.” (Mizan News Agency – November 21)

Alireza Adyani, head of the Ideological-political Organization of the police force: “The incidents of recent days in the country were more complicated than those which occurred in 1999, 2009 and 2018. In one day alone, unrest erupted in 165 cities of 25 provinces. The recent sedition caused insecurity in 900 locations...” (Rasa News Agency, November 21)

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“I believe 34 MEK members have been arrested so far. A vast network of individuals, operating not under the MEK’s name, but pursuing their line and modus operandi, were also identified.”

Salar Abnoush, Commander of Bassij Operations: “There was an all-out world war against the state and the revolution. A strange and incredible coordination in the current sedition was formed and they were only waiting for a spark to destroy the country. Additional information will be provided after extracting confessions... I believe God was our savior.” (ISNA News Agency, November 21)

Gholamhossein Esmaili, the Judiciary Spokesman: “According to the IRGC’s report, around 100 leaders and essential elements of these riots have been arrested in different parts of the country. Other people, more than the above, have been identified by the MOIS and a number of them have been arrested, or are on the verge of being arrested.” (*Javan* weekly, November 24)

Suppression and the regime's crimes

Overview

The regime's Assembly of Experts issued a statement on November 22, calling on "all security and judiciary organs to identify, confront, and put on trial the leaders and elements responsible for the riots, and to deal with them with unqualified decisiveness."

On November 21, Tehran Radio broadcast a speech by Tehran's Friday prayer leader Ahmad Khatami. He told his audience: "One of the expectations from you is to identify the thugs. ... Without any feelings of empathy, report these thugs to officials. Do the same thing that you did against the *hypocrites* (MEK) in the first stage of the revolution. You saw how we got rid of the MEK. People came on the scene. Sometimes, a father whose son was an MEK supporter would turn him in. I believe that in view of the extensive plot that these people designed, we must seek and pursue them from house to house and turn them in to officials."



Protesters gather to confront state security forces in the southern city of Shiraz.

Khatami added: “I say to the Judiciary: The first thing is that judicial officials must hand down the ultimate punishment to the organizers and leaders of these gangs, those who killed people, those who committed robbery, those who intimidated, whether it was they, themselves or they cooperated with others. As a cleric with over 20 years of experience teaching in religious seminaries about *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), I say that these people are *baqi* (disobedient), they are *mohareb* (waging war on God), and they must face the ultimate punishment (i.e. death). Regarding their followers, I say to the Judiciary that you must act with decisiveness so that these people would forever feel remorseful and never feel the urge to commit such riots again. And, others would learn a lesson about this episode.”

On November 21, the state-run Baran TV broadcast a speech by Mullah Falahati, the Friday prayer leader in the northern city of Rasht, who said: “The Judiciary must firmly hand down the ultimate punishment for the main elements of the recent riots who are responsible for disturbing the peace.”

Tehran’s Friday prayer leader Ahmad Khatami: “... judicial officials must hand down the ultimate punishment to the organizers and leaders of these gangs.”

The regime's prosecutor in Alborz Province, Haji Reza Shakarami, said: "The judge can declare that those who disrupt security, if they intend to overthrow the system or damage public and private assets, are *mohareb* or *mofsid fil-arz* (corrupters of the Earth; both charges carry death sentences). They themselves are responsible for the consequences." (*Serat News*, November 19)

The state-run *Kayhan* daily wrote on November 19: "Some of the reports indicate that judicial officials are certain that punishment by the noose will be delivered to the leaders of the recent riots."

The state-run *Kayhan*: "...judicial officials are certain that punishment by the noose will be delivered to the leaders of the recent riots."

Red alert mobilization and organizational chart

Organizational structure of the regime's apparatus of suppression during an uprising (State of emergency and red alert)

The clerical regime declared a red alert during the uprising, in accordance with which, starting at 1400 local time on Saturday, November 16, 2019, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) completely took command of the nationwide suppression and all suppressive forces. This report provides a summary of the organizational structure of the suppression. (See the Command chart in the next section.)

- 1. Preparation of the suppression machinery prior to the announcement of the fuel price hike:** From November 10, the regime's suppressive apparatus, including the IRGC, the State Security Forces (SSF), the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), and the Sarollah Garrison, were put on alert. In addition to meetings held by the Supreme National Security Council, the Interior Ministry's Security Council chaired by Brig. Gen. Hossein Zolfaqari was established and various security plans were reviewed in the provinces across the country. Zolfaqari is the deputy security and law enforcement official in the Interior Ministry. In these meetings, the MOIS was represented by Mirshafiei, a deputy minister. Brig. Gen. Mohammad Kazemi, head of the Protection section of the IRGC Intelligence Organization and a representative of the IRGC Sarollah Garrison, were also present. It was declared in these meetings that the decision to increase fuel prices was considered top secret and that all actions must be taken in accordance with orders and the regime's plan. It is noteworthy that the Security Council of the Interior Ministry and the Provincial Council controlled security matters before the emergency declaration and red alert. After the declaration was made, the IRGC took direct command over the suppression, with all other security organs, including the SSF and the MOIS, taking their orders from the IRGC.
- 2. Khamenei's role at the helm of the suppression:** The dictatorship's top authority, Ali Khamenei, personally oversaw the suppression. On Sunday morning, November 17, he publicly endorsed the decision to hike fuel prices and acknowledged that he was behind the announcement. He also issued an order to suppress the protests. The brutal wave of suppression subsequently intensified, with IRGC snipers and forces targeting the protesters' heads and chests in a bid to slaughter them.
- 3. The regime's Supreme National Security Council:** This council is chaired by the regime's president, Hassan Rouhani, and is the highest decision-making body in the country when it comes to political and security matters. The heads of the three branches of government are all permanent members of the council, which signed the order to increase fuel prices. All the members were also involved in the suppression of the uprising.
- 4. IRGC Supreme Command Council:** Chaired by the IRGC Commander-in-Chief, this body is comprised of all the IRGC senior commanders. It is the highest decision-making body in the IRGC and oversees suppression in Iran. After unrest erupted in Iran in 2009, the regime recognized the potential


for an uprising as its most existential threat. The IRGC was consequently reorganized in 2009 and divided into provincial divisions for each of the 31 provinces. During the November 2019 uprising, the IRGC established itself as critically and criminally key to the brutal suppression.

5. **Sarollah Garrison, Command HQ of Suppression in Tehran Province:** In view of the sensitive status of the capital city, Tehran, for the dictatorship's existence, the clerical regime established a concentrated suppression garrison named Sarollah. The IRGC Commander-in-Chief is the commander of this base, which commands all of the regime's other suppressive organs, including the SSF and the MOIS, during a state of emergency. Sarollah Garrison has divided Tehran Province into four regions for suppression. (See the organizational chart attached.)
6. **Provincial IRGC command bases:** In each province, the province's IRGC Commander oversees the operations of all suppressive forces. In a state of emergency, the SSF, MOIS provincial office, the local judiciary and other organs are under the command of the provincial IRGC, similar to the Sarollah Garrison model instituted in Tehran.

Clearly, the organizational structure of the suppression of the Iranian people's uprising has the person of Khamenei at the helm, with the IRGC playing a command role. Despite the comprehensive preparations that all of the regime's suppressive forces had made, they could not control the uprising after it started. They, therefore, quickly declared a red alert in the entire country, cut off the Internet, and resorted to a massacre as ordered by Khamenei and the IRGC's command.

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Command chart of regime's apparatus of suppression during an uprising (State of emergency and red alert)



“Controlling Riots and Protests”

In a highly confidential directive, entitled “Controlling Riots and Protests,” the operational methods to crack down on popular protests have been outlined. Obtained from the “Law Enforcement Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran” (Farsi acronym NAJA, referred to as State Security Force, SSF, in this report), the directive lists the SSF’s suppressive modus operandi and definitions.

According to information obtained by the MEK from within the regime, at 2:00 pm local time, Saturday, November 16, the SSF declared a state of red alert, whereby the SSF handed over responsibility for suppression of the uprising to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). SSF forces were put under IRGC command, making it palpably clear that the SSF was unable to control the situation and the regime felt itself in critical danger.

An alert regarding the state of the nation’s security is defined as:

1. Normal state: White
2. Abnormal state: Gray
3. Extraordinary state: Yellow
4. Critical state: Red



Demonstrators challenge state security forces under a cloud of smoke.

SSF forces were put under IRGC command, making it palpably clear that the SSF was unable to control the situation and the regime felt itself in critical danger.

Red alert

The regime's definition: "In this critical situation, the country's vital locations and facilities, military, law enforcement, and intelligence centers come under attack and are occupied. In these circumstances,

1. If this happens in a city or a province, the IRGC with all available forces enters into action if necessary, on the orders of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces or the Supreme National Security Council.
2. The SSF is placed under the IRGC's operational control and carries out its responsibilities.
3. The Ministry of Intelligence and the Judiciary provide the necessary logistical support.
4. All government organizations and institutions are duty-bound to put their resources, based on the statement by the Supreme National Security Council, at the disposal of the region's senior military commander to support the actions of the SSF.
5. If this situation expands to several provinces or throughout the country, the SNSC will take more decisions that are fundamental."

Command and Control Headquarters

Another directive, also obtained from the SSF, entitled “Operational Actions of the Command and Control HQ,” outlines comprehensive and detailed planning for suppression of popular protests. It is classified as “Highly Confidential.”

The pamphlet characterizes and divides protests into three alert status:

- ☉ Operational action by the command and control headquarters vis-à-vis peaceful but unlawful assemblies (Status 1)
- ☉ Operational action by the command and control headquarters vis-à-vis unlawful assemblies during police action (Status 2)
- ☉ Operational action by the command and control headquarters vis-à-vis general rebellion (Status 3)

According to the above status definitions, the recent uprising of the Iranian people is status 3. The pamphlet outlines some actions related to this status:

Internal Actions

- ☉ Issue alert to provinces and activate second battle order
- ☉ Issue order to special unit to dispatch forces to the relevant provincial center
- ☉ Video monitoring of the mission location

External Actions

- ☉ Notification to provincial prosecutor
- ☉ Notification to provincial IRGC and request dispatch of reinforcements
- ☉ Notification to provincial Intelligence [MOIS]

Translation of Original Document:

“Actions of Provincial Command and Control Headquarters”

Internal Organizational Actions

1. Immediate notification to SSF Operations Directorate at CCHQ (Command and Control Headquarters)

2. Notification to chain of command
3. Issue alert to provinces and activate second battle order
4. Notification to heads of special police (prevention, investigations, intelligence and security)
5. Issue order to special unit to dispatch forces to the relevant provincial center
6. Dispatch of reinforcements from other provincial centers
7. Request reinforcements from SSF CCHQ if necessary
8. Issue alert to provincial investigative and neutralization team and dispatch to scene of incident if necessary
9. Video monitoring of the mission location
10. Notification to provincial border control (for border provinces)
11. Notification to provincial social directorate to document and coordinate with press for publication of news to prevent rumors
12. Notification to provincial social directorate to conduct interviews in accordance with the commander's aims and instructions and notifications issued from the Supreme National Security Council
13. Issue order to provincial centers to increase protection of officials and classified facilities
14. Issue alert orders to neighboring provincial centers
15. Issue alert to medical services to send special ambulances for your own forces
16. Dispatch special investigative unit of provincial operations directorate to scene of incident.
17. Notify SSF CCHQ of updates
18. Request SSF announce alert
19. Implement plan to recall personnel in neighboring provincial centers (if necessary)
20. Implement plan to recall personnel (if necessary)

External Organizational Actions

1. Notification to provincial governor and follow up for convening of provincial protection council

اقدامات مرکز فرماندهی و کنترل استان

اقدامات درون سازمانی:

- ۱- اطلاع رسانی آنی به مرفوک معاونت عملیات ناجا
- ۲- اطلاع رسانی به سلسله مراتب فرماندهی
- ۳- اعلام آمادگی به شهرستان ها و فعال نمودن سازمان دوم رزم
- ۴- اطلاع رسانی به روسای پلیس های تخصصی (پیشگیری، آگاهی و پاوا)
- ۵- ایلاغ به یگان ویژه برای اعزام نیرو به شهرستان مربوطه
- ۶- اعزام نیروهای کمکی از سایر شهرستان ها
- ۷- درخواست نیروی کمکی از مرفوک ناجا در صورت لزوم
- ۸- اعلام آمادگی به تیم کشف و خنثی سازی استان و در صورت لزوم، اعزام به محل حادثه
- ۹- پایش تصویری محل مأموریت
- ۱۰- اطلاع رسانی به مرزیانی استان (برای استان های مرزی)
- ۱۱- اعلام به معاونت اجتماعی استان جهت مستندسازی و هماهنگی با رسانه ها جهت انتشار اخبار مربوطه به منظور جلوگیری از شایعه پراکنی
- ۱۲- ایلاغ به معاونت اجتماعی استان برای انجام مصاحبه بنا به تدبیر فرمانده و دستورالعمل های ایلاغی اطلاع رسانی صادره از شاک
- ۱۳- ایلاغ به شهرستان ها جهت تشدیدحفاظت از مسئولین و اماکن دارای طبقه بندی
- ۱۴- صدور دستورات هوشیاری به شهرستان های همجوار
- ۱۵- اعلام به پهداری برای اعزام آمبولانس ویژه نیروهای خودی
- ۱۶- اعزام تیم کارشناسی معاونت عملیات استان به محل برای بررسی
- ۱۷- اعلام اختیار تکمیلی به مرکز فرماندهی و کنترل ناجا
- ۱۸- درخواست از ناجا برای اعلام آماده باش
- ۱۹- اجرای طرح احضار برای شهرستان های همجوار (در صورت لزوم)
- ۲۰- اجرای طرح احضار پرسنل (در صورت لزوم)

اقدامات برون سازمانی:

- ۱- اعلام به استاندار و پیگیری جهت تشکیل شورای تامین استان
- ۲- اعلام به مرکز اورژانس استان جهت اعزام آمبولانس و انتقال مصدومین به مراکز درمانی در صورت لزوم
- ۳- هماهنگی با بیمارستان های استان در صورت اعزام مصدومان تجمع به خارج از شهرستان
- ۴- اعلام به دادستان استان
- ۵- اطلاع به سپاه استان و اعلام آمادگی برای اعزام نیرو در صورت ضرورت
- ۶- اعلام به اطلاعات استان

2. Notification to provincial emergency center to send ambulances and transport injured to medical centers if necessary
3. Coordination with provincial hospitals in case of transfer of injured from assemblies to outside of the province
4. Notification to provincial prosecutor
5. Notification to provincial IRGC and request for dispatch of reinforcements
6. Notification to provincial Intelligence [MOIS]

Wireless communications reveal regime's inability to curb protests

Intercepted wireless communications between repressive security forces in the city of Robot Karim and IRGC Brigadier General Hossein Rahimi, head of the Greater Tehran Security Zone, on November 16 indicate the growing fear among the commanders on the ground. The voice of the security commander reporting from the Governorate office is heard requesting immediate reinforcements: “The situation is red. The protesters are heading towards the Governorate office. They are around

“The situation is red. The protesters are heading towards the Governorate office. They are around 5,000 people. If Bashir [garrison forces] comes late, the Governorate will fall.”

5,000 people. If Bashir [garrison forces] comes late, the Governorate will fall. The transcript of the communication:

- ☑ Command Post to Bashir: Tell Bashir-2 to report to Robat Karim's Governorate
- ☑ Copy that.
- ☑ Ammar1 HQ: Go ahead
- ☑ The situation is red. The protesters are heading towards the Governorate office. They are around 5000 people. If Bashir comes late, the Governorate will fall.
- ☑ Anvari: Get help from IRGC elements close by. I will speak with Bashir as well.
- ☑ Bashir-2 from HQ: IRGC says they have no orders. They will not help. They recommend using plainclothes agents.
- ☑ Plainclothes won't do the job.
- ☑ Coordination was arranged whereby the IRGC would come to your aid from their garrison out there and protect the Governorate. Why won't they come?
- ☑ They say they have no such orders. I can't do the job with only plainclothes. They are destroying everything. There are 5000 people.

Wireless communications of suppressive forces in Shahriar district, southwest Tehran, recorded by Resistance units

The following communication indicates that the special reinforcement unit of the State Security Force, assigned to suppress protest gatherings, was forced to retreat by protesters.

- ☑ Command Center: Has the reinforcement unit arrived yet?
- ☑ Reply: The unit is here but they are being forced to retreat.
- ☑ Headquarters: OK, it will be relayed to colleagues at the headquarters

A communication about capture of a police station and a center of the paramilitary Bassij force

- ☺ From headquarters to Malek-1: What is the priority now, Vali-Asr or Faz-1? (two areas in Shahriar). Relay this message to Malek, relay to Malek, relay to Malek-1 and ask if Faz-1 is the priority now or not. If you have no problem in Vali-Asr, dispatch forces of Heydar, Malek-1 also go to Faz-1 and wrap up the problem there.
- ☺ Police Command Center: My friends, please note, Rahvar (Traffic Police) base in Saba-Shahr (suburb of Shahriar) has been overrun and the Bassij base of Mireh has also been overrun. According to 21-1 (code name of a police unit), they are now moving toward Saba-Shahr.

Massacre in Mahshahr

According to numerous reports, the mullahs' regime carried out a vicious killing spree, a massacre, on November 18 against protesters in Mahshahr, a southwestern city with a population of 120,000 people. In a December 2 frontpage article entitled "As Angry Citizens Staged Protests, Iran Opened Fire," *The New York Times* cited eyewitness reports, writing that in Mahshahr alone, witnesses and emergency officials said 40 to 100 civilians were killed by the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), many of them young.

"Security forces began firing into the marshes at around 10:30 am on Monday, November 18," one eyewitness said. "The security forces opened fire into the marshes once again on Monday night."

The following is an exclusive report provided by Mahshahr residents:

"The IRGC units stationed in Khuzestan Province dispatched a commando brigade to Mahshahr under orders from the Khuzestan governor after locals blocked a road leading to nearby petrochemical sites. The units were equipped with tanks, armored personnel carriers, a variety of heavy and semi-heavy weaponry, and



A screen shot of a clip showing SSF trucks equipped with machine guns in the marshes of Mahshahr, November 18, 2019

even military gunships. These units first entered the Chamran (Jarahi) district and began opening fire on the people using AK-47s and 50-caliber heavy machine guns. They were also opening fire on civilians from helicopters. They were even targeting those in their homes who had not participated in the protests. Around 17 individuals, including two 4 and 8-year-old children, and even an old woman above the age of 70, were killed from direct IRGC fire.” (The exact number of those killed remains uncertain due to the fact that the youth were seen fleeing to the marshes and the IRGC opened fire blindly into the wetlands.)

“These units first entered the Chamran (Jarahi) district and began opening fire on the people using AK-47s and 50-caliber heavy machine guns. They were also opening fire on civilians from helicopters.”

On Monday, December 2, a resident of Mahshahr said: “I’m from this city and you know that in the recent protests we had the highest number of protesters killed after Kermanshah (western Iran). With over 20 petrochemical sites, Mahshahr is one of the largest petrochemical hubs in Iran and even in the Middle East. Bandar Khomeini, which is one of Iran’s largest commercial ports, is also located here. It is also one of the country’s largest oil exporting ports. (Most of Iran’s oil and the Abadan oil refineries’ production are exported through Mahshahr and Khark.) More significantly, Mahshahr is located between the two rivers of Zohreh and Jarahi. As a result, it has a very special agricultural and fishing stature among the cities of Khuzestan Province.

“The largest storage tanks and export sites of gasoline, diesel fuel, other oil products and various goods are near Mahshahr. While this city is the second largest in Khuzestan Province after Ahvaz, the locals of Mahshahr are living in utter poverty. Unemployment and poverty are rampant in many areas of Mahshahr...

“The IRGC even ordered the city hospital to refuse medical care to those injured in these clashes. The IRGC units entered three other districts on that same day where they continued their killing sprees. Clashes continued in the Taleghani district, where locals are armed. They defended themselves and heavy gunfire continued non-stop from 6 pm Tuesday (November 19) to 1 am Wednesday (November 20). They entered the area with tanks, yet the locals defended their homes. The IRGC also suffered many casualties. Local sheikhs and elders mediated, resulting in an end to the clashes and the Taleghani district was surrounded. For three days the IRGC and other security forces were arresting youths in these areas. Clashes have stopped but the situation remains tense.”

Mahshahr police chief Reza Papi claimed members of dissident groups had sought refuge in the marshes and from there opened fire on his units. Mahshahr Governor Mohsen Biranvand said in a state TV interview that the main imports from the port of Mahshahr were being threatened, and considering the fact that only 400 trucks are delivering goods into the country each day from this port, it was vital for security forces to take urgent action.

Chapter 4

Regime officials involved in suppression of the uprising

Introduction

In this report, the Iranian Resistance has for the first time exposed details and photos of 92 of the key officials involved in the senseless, extrajudicial, and violent repression, murder, wounding, and detention of protesters in the seven provinces of Tehran, Alborz, Khuzestan, Fars, Isfahan, Kurdistan, and Kermanshah. These provinces were the scenes of the most significant, widespread, and pervasive of the recent protests.

Who's in charge?




Ali Khamenei
Regime's Supreme Leader




Hassan Rouhani
Regime's President



Mullah Ebrahim Raisi
Chief Justice



Ali Shamkhani
Secretary of SNSC



Hossein Salami
Commander-in-chief of IRGC



Ali Fadavi
Deputy Chief of IRGC



Mohammad Pakpour
Ground Forces Commander of
IRGC



IRGC Brig Gen. Hossein Ashtari
Commander of SSF



Gholamreza Soleimani
Commander of Bassij Force



Mullah Hossein Taeb
Head of IRGC Intelligence Org



Mullah Mahmoud Alavi
Intelligence Minister



Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi
Minister of Information and
Communications Technology



Alireza Avayi
Justice Minister



Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli
Interior Minister

Tehran Province

The capital Tehran, and other cities in Tehran Province were centers of protest from November 15 to 23. During this period, Tehran state security forces killed at least 83 protesters and wounded up to 800.

Some of the Iranian regime's officials involved in the criminal killing, wounding, and arrest of protesters:

IRGC of Greater Tehran

Mohammad Rasoulollah Corps



Mohammad-Reza Yazdi
Commander of Mohammad Rasoulollah Corps



Sirous Saberi
Deputy Commander of Mohammad Rasoulollah Corps



Hossein Dini
Deputy Coordinator of Mohammad Rasoulollah Corps



Mohammad Na'imi
representative of the Supreme Leader in Mohammad Rasoulollah Corps

Tehran Province Security Council



Mohammad Esmail Kosari
Deputy Commander of Sarollah Base of IRGC in Tehran



Hossein Salami
Commander in Chief of the IRCG and Commander of Sarollah Base of IRGC in Tehran



Anoushirvan Mohseni Band-Pey
Governor



Hamid Reza Goudarzi
Governor's Deputy on Security and Police Affairs



Ali Alqasi Mehr
Revolutionary Prosecutor General



Director General of Intelligence in Tehran Province



Hossein Rahimi
Commander of SSF of Greater Tehran



Kiomars Azizi
Commander of SSF in east of province



Mohsen Khancherli
Commander of SSF in west of province



Hassan Hassan-Zadeh
Commander of Seyyed Alshohada Corps in Tehran Province



Mohammad-Reza Yazdi
Commander of Mohammad Rasoulollah Corps of Greater Tehran

IRGC of Tehran Province Seyyed Alshohada Corp



Hassan Hassan-Zadeh
Commander of Seyyed
Alshohada Corps in Tehran
Province



Colonel Alireza Heydarnia
Deputy Coordinator of Seyyed
Alshohada Corps



**Colonel Majid Amir
Abdullahian**
Deputy Coordinator of Seyyed
Alshohada Corps

Kurdistan Province

Two cities in Kurdistan Province, Sanandaj and Marivan, were among the epicenters of the uprising from November 15 to 23. The Iranian regime's security forces killed fifty-three protesters and wounded about 500 during the course of the first few days of unrest.

Officials responsible for the killing, wounding, and arrest of the protesters include:

Command of Kurdistan Province's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) – Beit ol-Moqaddas Corps




Brig. Gen. Seyed Sadeq Hosseini
Beit ol-Moqaddas Corps Commander



Brig. Gen. Hamzeh Fallah,
Beit ol-Moqaddas Corps Deputy
Commander



Col. Jamshid Azadipor
Beit ol-Moqaddas Corps
Deputy Coordinator



Ahmad Jalili
Khamenei's Rep.
in Beit ol-Moqaddas Corps

Kurdistan Provincial Security Council



Hossein Khosh-Eghbal
Security and Social
Political Deputy



Bahman Moradnia
Governor



Mohammad Jabbari
Revolutionary
Prosecutor General



Ali Azadi
Commander of State
Security Forces of
Kurdistan Province



**Brig. Gen. Seyed
Sadeq Hosseini**
Beit ol-Moqaddas
Corps Commander



Provincial Intelligence
Director General

Marivan



Col. Vali Aei
Marivan IRGC
Commander

Khuzestan Province

Two cities in Khuzestan Province, Ahwaz and Mahshahr were in revolt November 14 to 23. During this period, security forces killed 87 protesters and wounded nearly 900 in the province.

Criminals implicated in the killing, wounding, and arrest of protesters in Khuzestan include:


IRGC Command Khuzestan Province (Hazrat-e-vali-Asr Corps)



General Hassan Shahvarpoor
Hazrat-e-vali-Asr Corps
Commander



Colonel Abdolreza Hajati
Coordinator and Deputy
Commander
Hazrat-e-vali-Asr Corps



General Moinpoor
Second-in-command
Hazrat-e-vali-Asr Corps



Mullah Abdolreza Rastegari
Khamenei's representative
Hazrat-e-vali-Asr Corps

Abadan



IRGC Lt. Colonel Ahmadi
IRGC Commander for Abadan

Andimeshk




IRGC Lt. Colonel Abollah Kheiranpoor
IRGC Commander for Behbahan district

Behbahan



IRGC Lt. Colonel Ehsan Karimpoor
IRGC Commander for Andimeshk

Mahshahr



IRGC Colonel Karim Babaei
IRGC Commander for Mahshahr

Khuzestan Province Security Council



Habibollah Asefi
Deputy for Security



Gholamreza Sharlati
Governor



Abbas Hosseini Pooya
Revolutionary Prosecutor general




Ali-Hossein Hosseinzadeh
Social-political deputy



Heydar Abbaszadeh
State security forces' commander



Hassan Shahvarpoor
Commander
IRGC Vali-e-Asr provincial Corps



Hossein Bagherzadeh
Intelligence Director-general for the province

Mahshahr City Security Council



IRGC Colonel Karim Babaei
IRGC Commander for Mahshahr



Mohsen Biravand
Governor of Mahshahr



IRGC Colonel Reza Papi
SSF Commander for Mahshahr




Mehdi Mohammadi
Revolutionary Prosecutor General for Mahshahr

Kermanshah Province

Two of the main centers of revolt in Kermanshah Province, November 14-22, were the cities of Kermanshah and Javanrood.

Some of the criminals who took part in killing, injuring, and arresting protesters are:

IRGC Command Kermanshah province (Nabi Akram Corps)



General Bahman Rohani
Commander of Nabi Akram Corps



Colonel Morteza Moradi
Second-in-command of Nabi
Akram Corps



Mullah Shamsollah Jalilian
Khamenei's representative in Nabi
Akram Corps



Colonel Bayati
Deputy Coordinator for Nabi
Akram Corps



Colonel Moussavi
Inspector General of Nabi Akram
Corps

Kermanshah Province Security Council



Mohamad-Ebrahim Elahi-Tabar
Political-security and social
deputy



Hooshang Bazvand
Governor




Mohamad-Hossein Sadeghi
Revolutionary Prosecutor
general



Ali-Akbar Javidan
State security forces's
commander



Bahman Reyhani
Commander
IRGC Nabi Akram provincial
Corps



Haji Khorassani
Intelligence Director-general
for the province

Javanrood



**IRGC Lt. Colonel Abouzar
Anvari**
Commander of Javanrood Corps

Fars Province

Shiraz and Kazeroun in Fars Province formed major centers of uprising from November 15 to November 23. During this period, regime security forces martyred 30 of the protesters and wounded some 300.

Criminals directly involved in murdering, injuring, and arresting protesters include:

Command of the IRGC in Fars Province (Fajr Corps)



Brigadier Hashem Ghiasi
Commander of Fajr Corps



Brigadier Yadollah Bouali
Deputy Commander of Fajr Corps



**IRGC Colonel
Ali Mohammad Mohammadi**
Deputy Coordinator of Fajr Corps

Fars Province Security Council



Seyed Ahmad Ahmadizadeh
Deputy Governor for Political,
Security, Social Affairs



Enayat'ollah Rahimi
Governor



Heydar Asiyabi
Revolutionary Prosecutor General



Rahambakhsh Habibi
Commander of State Security
Forces of Fars Province



Brigadier Hashem Ghiasi
Commander of IRGC Fajr Corps
(assigned to Fars Province)



Director of the MOIS
in Fars Province

Kazeroun



**IRGC Lt. Colonel Shahram
Afshari**
Commander of IRGC in Kazeroun

Isfahan Province

One of the main areas of uprising from November 15 to 23 was Isfahan and its suburbs. During this period, 32 of the protesters were martyred and some 300 were wounded.

The murderers who were directly involved in killing, injuring, and arresting protesters include:

Command of the IRGC in Isfahan Province



Brigadier Mojtaba Fada
Commander of IRGC in Isfahan
Province



Colonel Abedini
Deputy Coordinator of IRGC in
Isfahan


Isfahan Province Security Council



Heydar Ghasemi
Deputy Governor for Political,
Security, Social Affairs



Abbas Rezaie
Governor



Ali Esfahani
Revolutionary Prosecutor General



Mehdi Masoubeygi
Commander of State Security
Forces of Isfahan Province



IRGC Brigadier Mojtaba Fada
Commander of IRGC Sahebol
Zaman Corps (assigned to Isfahan
Province)



Bahrami
Director of the MOIS
in Isfahan Province

Alborz Province

Karaj city was one of the most active centers of uprisings from November 15 to 23, along with other towns and cities in this province. During this period, state security forces killed 9 protesters and arrested about 100 in this province.

Key criminal officials involved in killing, wounding, and arrest of protesters are as follows:



IRGC Brigadier General Yousef Molaie

Commander of Imam Hassan Mojtaba Corps



Ali Tarkashvand

Head of Bassij Construction Organization of Imam Hassan Mojtaba Corps



IRGC Colonel Valiollah Shadman

Deputy Coordinator of Imam Hassan Mojtaba Corps



Mullah Alimorad Yousefi

Supreme Leader's Representative in Imam Hassan Mojtaba Corps

Alborz Province Security Council



Unidentified



Azizollah Shahbazi
Governor



Haji Reza Shah Karami
Revolutionary Prosecutor General



Abbas-Ali Mohammadian
Commander of State Security
Forces in Alborz Province



**IRGC Brigadier General Yousef
Molaie**
Commander of Imam Hassan
Mojtaba Corps



General Director of the MOIS in
Alborz Province

Main takeaways of the November uprising

1. The decision to raise the price of gasoline was a unanimous decision in which the regime in its entirety, including the heads of its three branches as well as all of its factions, were involved, with the full approval of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. Imposing so extreme a price hike at the expense of the Iranian people reveals the regime's extreme need and desperation.
2. The speed with which the protests expanded to various towns and cities, all with common political slogans that defied the regime in its entirety, revealed the potential and readiness of Iranian society to overthrow the regime.
3. As regime analysts themselves have admitted, contrary to previous protests, this uprising's slogans did not express any demands from the regime. The atmosphere and behavior prevalent among the protesters had radicalized in the extreme. This was demonstrated in the torching of the regime's centers and posters of Khamenei, among other acts. During the 2017-2018 uprising,

there were only 50 attacks on regime centers. This time, however, even though precise figures are still being compiled, it seems that thousands of regime-affiliated buildings were targeted.

4. The suppressive tactics used in this uprising were not comparable to those employed during the uprisings of 2009 and 2017/2018. The number of martyrs, wounded and detainees of the previous protests combined are a fraction of those in the current uprising.
5. This time, Khamenei himself immediately came to the scene and, while announcing that the regime would not retreat (from the gas price hike), he ordered his forces to suppress the protests. This exposes the regime's complete inability to handle any retreat. It is terrified of being overthrown.
6. The unique feature of this uprising compared to the 2018 protests is that, although the driving force in 2018 was the MEK's Resistance units, at that time they were in their infancy and just beginning their endeavors. This time, Resistance units had spread extensively and had gained vast experience from thousands of prior political and social acts of protest.
7. Another difference was that the uprising erupted just as the regime was being hit with major blows to its meddling in Iraq and Lebanon, which Tehran considers its "strategic depth." In Iraq, in particular, people chanted slogans against Khamenei and IRGC Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani.
8. The clerical regime and Khamenei himself are faced with a crisis of overthrow and see their only way out as suppressing the popular will and demands. As such, the standing of those demanding overthrow is more strongly consolidated as the alternative in real political terms and the real balance of power.
9. The regime failed to prevent the outbreak of rebellion. The uprising revealed to the entire world the ruling apparatus' weak and unstable situation.
10. The uprising also revealed that the Iranian people are united and have a single voice when it comes to demanding the overthrow of the regime. The people in Fars, Isfahan, Tehran, and Mashhad speak with one voice and relay the same demands as Kurds in Marivan and Sanandaj, and as Arab-Iranians in

Mahshahr and Ahvaz. Everyone sees that the path to democracy and freedom in Iran goes through the overthrow of the clerical regime.

11. The strategy of “Resistance Units and Rebellious Cities,” which the Iranian Resistance’s Leader announced several years ago prior to the 2018 uprising, has proven its efficacy and legitimacy. In the aftermath of the 2018 uprising, the Iranian Resistance said that the situation in Iran would never revert to what it had been. The recent uprising provided further proof of the correctness of that assessment.
12. The protests have demonstrated not only the desire of the Iranian people for change, but also confirmed that the firm U.S. policy on Iran, including imposition of sanctions, has not rallied people behind the regime. The protests show that public anger is directed at the regime as solely responsible for their suffering.

Chapter 6

What should be done?

- ☉ The slaughter of protesters is a clear case of a crime against humanity. Therefore, the United Nations Security Council, governments and the international community should take urgent action to put an immediate halt to the killings and suppression, and secure the release of those detained.
- ☉ These atrocities were carried out away from the watchful eyes of Iranians and the outside world after the clerical regime shut down the internet and cut Iran off from the rest of the world. Therefore, investigative missions must be sent to Iran to evaluate the scope of the crimes and examine the cases of those killed, wounded and/or detained.
- ☉ The leaders of the regime, beginning with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei who, on November 17, gave the green light for the all-out crackdown, and

President Hassan Rouhani, who doubled down on Khamenei's call, must be held accountable for crimes against humanity.

- ☑ Silence and inaction vis-à-vis these crimes against humanity not only violate international conventions, laws, and standards, but also embolden the mullahs to continue such atrocities in Iran and the region.
- ☑ The United States should sanction Western companies and any other entities that aid the Iranian regime with the sale and provision of services, products, and solutions that enable it to monitor, control, and block internet access by Iranian citizens. In addition, the United States should adopt all measures necessary to diminish and disable the regime's capacity to block internet traffic in Iran.
- ☑ The United States should provide safe, secure, and uninterrupted internet access to Iran's people, including the protesters, who seek nothing but a free, democratic and nonnuclear republic.
- ☑ It is time for the world to recognize the right of the Iranian people to change the repressive regime and establish a democratic, pluralistic and non-nuclear republic based on separation of religion and state.

Appendix 1: Partial list of those fallen for freedom



Names of 504 murdered protesters (identified as of December 15, 2019)

1. Tehran – Amir Hossein Sadeqi
2. Tehran – Hamid Reza Qabouli
3. Tehran – Majid Hessabi
4. Tehran – Seyed Hamid Taheri
5. Tehran – Nikta Esfandbani (14 years of age)
6. Tehran – Majid Fallahpour
7. Tehran – Mina Sheikhi
8. Tehran – Golnar Samsami
9. Tehran – Sajjad Baqeri
10. Tehran – Fereidoun Kazemi
11. Tehran – Ali Behboudi
12. Tehran – Ali Morad-Manesh
13. Tehran – Abdollah Ajarloo
14. Tehran – Ali Dahlir
15. Tehran – Yashar Alizadeh
16. Tehran – Peyman Nouri
17. Tehran – Mahmoud Valiollahi
18. Tehran – Moussa Shahsavand
19. Tehran – Ali Shahsavand
20. Tehran – Hamzeh Shahsavand
21. Tehran – Khosro Bakhtiari
22. Tehran – Saeed Yousefi
23. Tehran – Hossein Yami
24. Tehran – Hossein Issavand
25. Tehran – Seyed Qassem Hosseini
26. Tehran – Erfan Faeqi
27. Tehran – Mehrdad Moin
28. Tehran – Payman Qolipour
29. Tehran – Majid Sheikhi
30. Tehran – Hossein Niaz
31. Tehran – Mehran Zahedi
32. Tehran – Siamak Navidi Bildashi
33. Tehran – Esmaeel Arab Ahmadi
34. Tehran – Ali Ostovan
35. Tehran – Nassim Qorbani
36. Tehran – Yusef Dari
37. Tehran – Aria Sadeqi
38. Tehran – Esmael Rezaei Pirposhteh
39. Tehran – Taqi Ali-Loo
40. Tehran – Ahmad Morad
41. Tehran – Amir Alizadeh
42. Tehran – Ahmad Moradi
43. Tehran – Misagh Maleki
44. Tehran – Islamshahr – Mohsen Mozafari
45. Tehran – Islamshahr – Hossein Qassemi
46. Tehran – Mostafa (Ali) Abrotan Lanagran
47. Tehran – Mohammad Safari
48. Tehran – Ali Farvan Langaran
49. Tehran – Ramin Lamseh
50. Tehran – Hossein Niazi
51. Tehran – Ali Sepehri
52. Tehran – Qolamreza Qazi-Zahedi
53. Tehran – Yasin (Mujtaba) Ramezan-nejad
54. Tehran – Abolfazl Azarm
55. Tehran – Mohammad Reza Mohammadi
56. Tehran – Hossein Taheri
57. Tehran – Esmaeel Rezazadeh
58. Tehran – Esmaeel Alahqoli
59. Tehran – Meysam Jafari
60. Tehran – Ali Akbar Abroutan
61. Tehran – Boumehen – Arham Moayd Bakhtiari
62. Tehran – Kianshahr – Mohsen Karaminia
63. Tehran – Robat Karim – Mohsen Hosseini
64. Tehran – Robat Karim – Mohammad Mahdavi
65. Tehran – Robat Karim – Iman Fatahi
66. Tehran – Robat Karim – Marzieh Abbas Zadeh
67. Tehran – Robat Karim – Abdolhamid Baqeri
68. Tehran – Robat Karim – Peyman Shahabi
69. Tehran – Robat Karim – Mohammad Mohebnia
70. Tehran – Robat Karim – Ali Kermanshahi
71. Tehran – Robat Karim – Alireza Zabeti
72. Tehran – Robat Karim – Alireza Shafaei
73. Tehran – Robat Karim – Maryam Nouri
74. Tehran – Robat Karim – Javid Mirzai
75. Tehran – Robat Karim – Hossein Amini
76. Tehran – Qods – Hossein Shahbazi
77. Tehran – Qods – Alizadeh
78. Tehran – Qods – Javad Babaizadeh
79. Tehran – Qods – Navid Behboodi
80. Tehran – Qods – Hamid Hosseini
81. Tehran – Qods – Fallahati
82. Tehran – Qods – Reza Einalou

83. Tehran – Qods – Heidar Ali Ramazan-nejad
84. Tehran – Islamshahar – Mehdi Valipour
85. Tehran – Islamshahr – Amir Reza Abdullahi
86. Tehran – Islamshahr – Iman Rassouli
87. Tehran – Islamshahr – Mohsen Jafarpanah
88. Tehran – Islamshahr – Arash Kohzadi
89. Tehran – Islamshahr – Mohammad Mehdi Haghgouy
90. Tehran – Shahriar – Esmaeel Qolipour
91. Tehran – Shahriar – Reza Hassanvand
92. Tehran – Shahriar – Ebrahim Mohammad-pour
93. Tehran – Shahriar – Azadeh Zarbi
94. Tehran – Shahriar – Mehdi Paapi
95. Tehran – Shahriar – Hossein Ghadami
96. Tehran – Shahriar – Mehdi Da’emi
97. Tehran – Shahriar – Ehsan Shiri
98. Tehran – Shahriar – Milad Nahjevand
99. Tehran – Shahriar – Aliollah Amini
100. Tehran – Shahriar – Qassem Rezai
101. Tehran – Shahriar – Yar Mohammadi
102. Tehran – Shahriar – Momeni
103. Tehran – Shahriar – Seyed Mohammad Hossein Tahaei
104. Tehran – Shahriar – Ali Qorbani
105. Tehran – Shahriar – Taqi Rahimi
106. Tehran – Shahriar – Nader Momeni
107. Tehran – Shahriar – Mehdi Golipour
108. Tehran – Shahriar – Behrouz Asgharpour
109. Tehran – Shahriar – Milad Mohaqeqi
110. Tehran – Shahriar – Mehran Jabouri
111. Tehran – Shahriar – Alireza Nouri
112. Tehran – Shahriar – Akbar Langari
113. Tehran – Shahriar – Mohammad Arabi
114. Tehran – Shahriar – Nader Mehdipour
115. Tehran – Shahriar – Pouria Nasserikhah
116. Tehran – Baharestan – Fatima Habibi
117. Tehran – Baharestan – Gol Agha Nouri
118. Tehran – Baharestan – Mohammad Taheri
119. Tehran – Shahriar – Ali Sartipi
120. Tehran – Shahriar – Mohammad Moin Salehi
121. Tehran – Nassim – Ahmad Hassanpour
122. Varamin – Hassan Khodai
123. Alborz Province (Fardis) – Pedram Jafari Kamijani
124. Alborz Province (Fardis) – Ashur Kalna (Christian)
125. Alborz Province (Fardis) – Omid Salehi
126. Alborz Province (Fardis) – Mohammad Amin-Allahqoli
127. Alborz Province (Fardis) – Babak Allah-Ejdehak
128. Alborz Province (Fardis) – Milad Mojevard
129. Alborz Province (Fardis) – Mahmoud Rahimi
130. Alborz Province (Fardis) – Hamid Qa’emi
131. Karaj – Mehdi Abbaszadeh
132. Karaj – Farrokh Qafari
133. Karaj – Mehdi Aghyari
134. Karaj – Mehdi Attarzadeh
135. Karaj – Mehdi Hamidi
136. Karaj – Reza Rahimi
137. Karaj – Hassan Delfan
138. Karaj – Mohsen Chamanfar
139. Karaj – Ali Bakhtiari
140. Karaj – Rassoul Bakhtiari
141. Karaj – Sadeq Bakhtiari
142. Karaj – Alireza Mohammadzadeh
143. Karaj – Mehdi Kloukhi
144. Karaj – Mehdi Moshtaqi
145. Karaj – Meysam Moradi
146. Karaj – Ali Pasha
147. Karaj – Milad Darvishi
148. Karaj – Mohammad Reza Nikuvaran
149. Karaj – Golshahr – Mehdi Taherzadeh
150. Karaj – Meshkinshahr – Aziz Eskandari
151. Karaj – Mallard – Reza Pazireh
152. Karaj – Mallard – Sajjad Rezai
153. Karaj – Mallard – Mohammad Teymouri
154. Karaj – Mallard – Mohammad Khazai
155. Karaj – Mallard – Milad Darvish Mohammadi
156. Karaj – Dariush Zibanejad Mofrad
157. Karaj – Omid Rezai
158. Karaj – Nasser Rezai
159. Karaj – Amir Hossein Kabiri
160. Karaj – Meysam Ahmadi
161. Karaj – Mahnaz Mehdizadeh Nader

162. Karaj – Morteza Sadeqi Nader
 163. Karaj – Ebrahim Mehdipour
 164. Karaj – Shahram Moini
 165. Karaj – Mehrshahr – Hamid Rassouli
 166. Karaj – Reza Mo'azami Goudarzi
 167. Karaj – Poya Bakhtiari
 168. Karaj – Hossein Qassemi
 169. Karaj – Ameneh Shahbazi
 170. Karaj – Amir Shokri
 171. Karaj – Farhad Majdam
 172. Karaj – Morteza Alizadeh
 173. Karaj – Alireza Azadi
 174. Karaj – Koroush Sheidani
 175. Karaj – Ali Rahmani
 176. Karaj – Mahan Faramarzi
 177. Karaj – Saeed Hamidi
 178. Karaj – Asqar Heshmatpour
 179. Karaj – Sina Mohammadi
 180. Karaj – Karim Baqeri
 181. Karaj – Mohammad-Parsa Azizi-Moqadam
 182. Karaj – Hossein Jamali
 183. Karaj – Iraj Mishmast
 184. Karaj – Sajjad Vatankhah
 185. Karaj – Qasem Nematipour
 186. Karaj – Mohsen Talivardi
 187. Karaj – Ali Hosseini
 188. Karaj – Rahim Akhavan
 189. Karaj – Meysam Mohammadi
 190. Karaj – Mohammad Reza Hosseini
 191. Karaj – Vahid Damvar
 192. Karaj – Azar Mirzapour Zahabi
 193. Karaj – (Fardis) Faramarz Poursadi
 194. Ahvaz – Reza Shahmoradi
 195. Ahvaz – Kamal Daghghele
 196. Ahvaz – Reza Darabpour
 197. Ahvaz – Masoumeh Darabpour
 198. Ahvaz – Mohammad Reza Ossafi Zargani
 199. Ahvaz – Hamzeh Sevari
 200. Ahvaz – Meysam Mojadam
 201. Ahvaz – Reza Atieh Neisi
 202. Ahvaz – Mohammad Barhi (Barbehi)
 203. Ahvaz – Ali Tamimi
 204. Ahvaz – Reza Shahmoradi
 205. Ahvaz – Kut Abdullah – Hamid Movahednejad
 206. Ahvaz – Hamid Avi
 207. Ahvaz – Mehdi Zargani
 208. Ahvaz – Abbas Barihi
 209. Ahvaz – Saeed Punki
 210. Ahvaz – Hani Shahbazi
 211. Behbahan – Mohammad Hossein Ghanavati
 212. Behbahan – Javid Naaman
 213. Behbahan – Mehrdad Dashtinia
 214. Behbahan – Mahmoud Dashtinia
 215. Behbahan – Ehsan Abdollah Nejad
 216. Behbahan – Mohammad Hashamdar
 217. Behbahan – Shabnam Diani
 218. Behbahan – Taddayon
 219. Behbahan – Farzad Ansari (Farzad Tazmipour)
 220. Khorramshahr – Mohsen Mohammadpour
 221. Khorramshahr – Meysam Mani'at (Nasseri)
 222. Khorramshahr – Khaled Mani'at
 223. Khorramshahr – Milad Hamidi
 224. Khorramshahr – Meysam Abdolvahab Adgipour
 225. Khorramshahr – Ali Ghazlavi
 226. Khorramshahr – Hassan Tamimi
 227. Andimeshk – Sajjad Miri
 228. Andimeshk – Shafi Baztab
 229. Andimeshk – Ali Esfandiari
 230. Andimeshk – Abdullah Yaqoubvand
 231. Andimeshk – Milad Najafvand
 232. Andimeshk – Abdullah Lorestani
 233. Andimeshk – Akbar Yaqoubi
 234. Andimeshk – Ali Eskandari
 235. Andimeshk – Shahram Shokrian
 236. Ramhurmoz – Khuzestan Province – Hadi Ghorbani
 237. Ramhurmoz – Khuzestan Province – Moussavi
 238. Ramhurmoz – Khuzestan Province – Nabi Saeed
 239. Ramhurmoz – Khuzestan Province – Rashedi
 240. Ramhurmoz – Bani Rashid
 241. Ramhurmoz – Ali Moussavi
 242. Shushtar – Ahmad Moussavi Jo'aveleh
 243. Shushtar – Abbas Ka'bi
 244. Shushtar – Mamoud Ka'bi

245. Shushtar – Reza Delfi
 246. Shushtar – Ali Soleimani
 247. Shushtar – Qassem Zaghabi
 248. Shushtar – Aref Delfi
 249. Shushtar – Jamal Kabi
 250. Shushtar – Adel Kabi Farzeh
 251. Shushtar – Ali Kabi
 252. Shushtar – Oudi Kabi
 253. Shushtar – Amar Zaghabi
 254. Shushtar – Mehdi Agabi
 255. Shushtar – Yas Soleimani
 256. Shushtar – Milad Soleimani
 257. Abadan – Ali Baghlani
 258. Abadan – Hamid Beshareh Doraqi
 259. Abadan – Ali Bavi
 260. Abadan – Ravanbakhsh Emami-Malmali
 261. Abadan – Ebrahim Matouri
 262. Abadan – Halimah Samiri
 263. Mahshahr – Hamid Sheikhani
 264. Mahshahr – Razzaq Nasserizadeh
 265. Mahshahr – Ms Hasineh Atighi
 266. Mahshahr – ... Hatavi
 267. Mahshahr – Ghassem Bavi
 268. Mahshahr – Mohammad Khaleghi
 269. Mahshahr – Adnan Helali
 270. Mahshahr – Mojtaba Ebadi
 271. Mahshahr – Mansour Daris
 272. Mahshahr – Abbas (Reza) Assakereh
 273. Mahshahr – Ahmad Khajeh Albughli
 274. Mahshahr – Ali Albughli
 275. Mahshahr – Mohammad Khaledi
 276. Mahshahr – Youssef Khaledi
 277. Mahshahr – Iqbal Esmaeeli
 278. Mahshahr – Salem Amirsanjaran Eidani
 279. Mahshahr – Farshad Hajipour
 280. Mahshahr – Taher Al-Khamis
 281. Mahshahr – Majid Mojadam
 282. Mahshahr – Amad Cheraghian
 283. Mahshahr – Jafar Al-e Khamis
 284. Mahshahr – Mansour Albavi
 285. Mahshahr – Mansour Asakereh
 286. Mahshahr – Yosef Albuebadi
 287. Mahshahr – Ali Moradi
 288. Shiraz – Seyed Keyvan Yarfi
 289. Shiraz – Hossein Bazrafshan
 290. Shiraz – Kianoush Qardashi
 291. Shiraz – Kambiz Qardashi
 292. Shiraz – Majid Reyhani
 293. Shiraz – Hamid Reyhani
 294. Shiraz – Hashem Zare
 295. Shiraz – Vahid Torabi
 296. Shiraz – Farshad Miri
 297. Shiraz – Amir Pasha Qarchivand
 298. Shiraz – Mohammad Tavasoli
 299. Shiraz – Mohammad Hossein Dastankhah
 300. Shiraz – Kellar – Rassoul Ghavami
 301. Shiraz – Mohammad Reza Jamshidi
 302. Shiraz – Bahman Jafari
 303. Shiraz – Marvdasht – Mehdi Nikoui
 304. Shiraz – Amir Alvandi
 305. Shiraz – Abdollah Ghavimi
 306. Shiraz – Mehdi Nekoui Ali Abadi
 307. Shiraz – Reza (Bahman) Jafari
 308. Shiraz – Majid Hashemi
 309. Shiraz – Janfeshan Assadi
 310. Shiraz – Parsai
 311. Shiraz – Parsai
 312. Shiraz – Mehdi Jahanbazi
 313. Shiraz – Mehdi Moqadamzadeh
 314. Shiraz – Mohammadreza Khorshidi
 315. Shiraz – Seyed Alireza Anjavi
 316. Shiraz – Sadeq Ahmad-Panahi
 317. Shiraz – Ahmad Reza Pour-Qayoumi
 318. Shiraz – Hamid Farhadi
 319. Shiraz – Amir Panahi
 320. Shiraz – Nader Assadi
 321. Shiraz – Jamal Qoreishi
 322. Shiraz – Mohammad Hossein Hourang
 323. Shiraz – Hossein Heidari
 324. Shiraz – Javad Nekoui
 325. Sirjan – Ruhollah Nazari Fat'habadi
 326. Garmsar – Hamid Qobakhlou
 327. Garmsar – Mohammad Amin Alikai
 328. Garmsar – Kouros Shahlai
 329. Garmsar – Hassan Tavooosi
 330. Sanandaj – Mozzafar Seifi
 331. Sanandaj – Fa'eq
 332. Sanandaj – Ali Baghlani
 333. Sanandaj – Saneh Shahoo
 334. Sanandaj – Mohammad-Reza Ahmadi

335. Sanandaj – Ziba Khoshgvar
 336. Sanandaj – Kaveh Veysani
 337. Sanandaj – Nasser Rahzai
 338. Sanandaj – Hiva Rahimi
 339. Sanandaj – Massoud Amini
 340. Sanandaj – Reza Sadeqi
 341. Sanandaj – Souran Mohammadi
 342. Sanandaj – Ali Javaheri
 343. Saqqez – Mohammad Heydarian
 344. Somesara – ... Kiaei
 345. Bukan – Shelir Dadvand
 346. Bukan – Hiva Naderi
 347. Marivan – Saman Bassami
 348. Marivan – Mehran Taak
 349. Marivan – Behrouz Maleki
 350. Marivan – Usman Naderi
 351. Marivan – Danial Ostovari
 352. Marivan – Edris Bivareh
 353. Marivan – Usman Ahmadi
 354. Marivan – Aryaan Rajabi
 355. Javanroud – Hamzeh Naghdi
 356. Javanroud – Farshad Kheirandish
 357. Javanroud – Ali (Yunes) Firouzbakht
 358. Javanroud – Yunes Houshang
 359. Javanroud – Kaveh Rezai
 360. Javanroud – Jabbar Tejareh
 361. Javanroud – Kaveh Mohammadi
 362. Javanroud – Salman Rahmani
 363. Javanroud – Ebrahim Moradi
 364. Javanroud – Mobin Abdollahi
 365. Javanroud – Omran Validi
 366. Javanroud – Bahram Qolami
 367. Javanroud – Arash Ayobi
 368. Javanroud – Ribvar Seyed-Rostami
 369. Shadegan – Mohsen Albuali
 370. Shadegan – Bassam Alboughbaish
 371. Shadegan – Ali Rashedi
 372. Kermanshah – Saeed Esmaeeli
 373. Kermanshah – Sadra Sarbaleh
 374. Kermanshah – Qolam Tabzar
 375. Kermanshah – Masoud Moradi
 376. Kermanshah – Manouchehr Fathi
 377. Kermanshah – Ali Alqasi
 378. Kermanshah – Vahid Fathi
 379. Kermanshah – Mohammad Naderi
 380. Kermanshah – Houshang Karimi
 381. Kermanshah – Saeed Amiri
 382. Kermanshah – Reza Mahmoodi
 383. Kermanshah – Saeed Bayj
 384. Kermanshah – Heshmat Moradi
 385. Kermanshah – Khosro Karimi
 386. Kermanshah – Mahmoud Rezai
 387. Kermanshah – Mazaher Rostami
 388. Kermanshah – Hessam Barani Rad
 389. Kermanshah – Esmaeel Qaderinia
 390. Kermanshah – Mozzafar Zahiri
 391. Kermanshah – Nader Biravand
 392. Kermanshah – Nader Bijanvand
 393. Kermanshah – Mohammad Mirzai
 394. Kermanshah – Mozzafar Vatandoust
 395. Kermanshah – Mostafa Farzami
 396. Kermanshah – Yunes Ezzati
 397. Kermanshah – Mostafa Bakeri
 398. Kermanshah – Abdollah Shahabadi
 399. Kermanshah – Mansour Fakhri
 400. Kermanshah – Ahmad Mansouri
 401. Kermanshah – Faramarz Rahimi
 402. Kermanshah – Abdolreza Shirzadi
 403. Kermanshah – Borhan Mansournia
 404. Kermanshah – Foad Joshan
 405. Kermanshah – Nemat Hosseini
 406. Kermanshah – Yunes Jalili
 407. Kermanshah – Saeed Rezai
 408. Kermanshah – Javad Karami
 409. Kermanshah – Bahman Azizi
 410. Kermanshah – Milad Shirazi
 411. Kermanshah – Hamzeh Faraji
 412. Kermanshah – Behzad Jooybareh
 413. Kermanshah – Mohammad Palani
 414. Kermanshah – Armin Qaderi
 415. Kermanshah – Danial Mohammadi
 416. Kermanshah – Hamid Borhani
 417. Kermanshah – Abdollah Mansouri
 418. Kermanshah – Mostafa Hemmatirad
 419. Kermanshah – Qader Bahmanyar
 420. Kermanshah – Afshin Jalili
 421. Kermanshah – Javad Palani
 422. Kermanshah – Mohsen Esfandiari
 423. Kermanshah – Bahman Kamrani
 424. Kermanshah – Mansour Rezai

425. Kermanshah – Shakiba Biranvand
 426. Kermanshah – Valiollah Pir-Hayati
 427. Kermanshah – Gholamreza Davoudi
 428. Kermanshah – Ibrahim Fadai
 429. Kermanshah – Esmaeel Kharmand
 430. Kermanshah – Abolfazl Bigdeli
 431. Kermanshah – Saber Tavasolkani
 432. Kermanshah – Mohammad Reza Nobakhti-Nia
 433. Kermanshah – Farshad Palevani
 434. Kermanshah – Sadeq Abbasi Kordnia
 435. Kermanshah – Ali Asghar Molania
 436. Kermanshah – Ali Javanroudi
 437. Kermanshah – Farzad Qassemi Moghaddam
 438. Kermanshah – Majid Assad Molania
 439. Kermanshah – Ahmad Shakeri
 440. Kermanshah – Mojtaba Esfandiar Sabet
 441. Kermanshah – Mohammad Javad Rostami
 442. Kermanshah – Rassoul Ziarati Khoshnam
 443. Kermanshah – Behrouz Fallahi Raad
 444. Kermanshah – Javad Mokhtari
 445. Kermanshah – Hossein Amini
 446. Kermanshah – Vahid Elahi
 447. Kermanshah – Behnam Amirian
 448. Eivan – Gharb – Ilam – Sajjad Esmaeeli
 449. Islamabad Gharb – Saeed Nurollahi
 450. Tabriz – Ali Hosseini
 451. Ardabil – Seyed Ali Fotohi Kouhsareh
 452. Ardabil – Mahyar Qorbani
 453. Ardabil – Arash Vakili
 454. Langroud – Pejman (Ali) Gholipour
 455. Yazdanshahr – Sassan Eidivand
 456. Yazdanshahr – Rasoul Amani
 457. Yazdanshahr – ... Davoudvand
 458. Isfahan – Masoud Baharloo
 459. Isfahan – Mohammad Javad Abedi
 460. Isfahan – Mohammad Pour Pirali
 461. Isfahan – Javad Shiyazi
 462. Isfahan – Arsham Ebrahimi
 463. Isfahan – Safar Eidivandi
 464. Isfahan – Ahmad Qorbani Dastjerdi
 465. Isfahan – Ebrahim Manssouri
 466. Isfahan – Arman Armani
 467. Isfahan – Amir Hossein Dadvand
 468. Isfahan – ... Shokrollahi
 469. Isfahan – Saeed Baharloo
 470. Isfahan – Majid Baharloo
 471. Isfahan – Hossein Baharloo
 472. Isfahan – Ali Sadeqi
 473. Isfahan – Hassan Parvaresh
 474. Isfahan – Pasha Ebrahimi
 475. Isfahan – ... Koleini
 476. Isfahan – Behzad Moenifar
 477. Isfahan – Yaqoub Najafi Hajipour
 478. Isfahan – Saeed Asadzadeh
 479. Isfahan – Mohammad Ebrahimi
 480. Isfahan – Heydar Shiazhi
 481. Isfahan – Hossein Karimi-Alvijeh
 482. Isfahan – ... Estaki
 483. Isfahan – Gholamreza Bahrami
 484. Isfahan – Hamid Sharifi
 485. Isfahan – Mehdi Sabzi
 486. Isfahan – Farshid Afarin
 487. Isfahan – Mohammad Arman
 488. Zanjan – Amir Hossein Abbasi
 489. Rasht – Parisa Seifi
 490. Saveh – Esmaeel Shojaee
 491. Arak – Farhad Miri
 492. Arak – Ali Assadi
 493. Arak – Massoud Saberi
 494. Dezful – Sohrab Khajeh-nouri
 495. Khorramabad – Omid Mohammad Mehrabi
 496. Khorramabad – Morteza Moradi
 497. Khorramabad – Seyed Mostafa Zare'zadeh
 498. Khorramabad – Farshad Darikvand
 499. Khorramabad – Hossein Paapi
 500. Minab – Hossein Torkamani
 501. Minab – Mohammad Jalali
 502. Gorgan – Hamed Semnani
 503. Gonabad – Hassan Sahrai
 504. Mashhad – Esmaeel Shiran

Children Murdered in Iran Protests * November 2019



Reza Abdullahi, 13



Nikta Esfandbani, 14



Mohammad Dastan-Khah, 15



Armin Ghaderi, 15



Amir Hossein Dadvand, 17




Mohammad Berihi, 17



Sasab Eidivand, 17



Reza Neissi, 16




Hessam Barani Rad



Ahmad M. Jo'avaleh, 17



Alireza Noori, 17



Mohsen Mohammadpour, 17



Reza Moazzami, 18



Pejman Gholipour, under 18



Pedram Jafari, 18



Mohammad Taheri, 17

Appendix 2:


List of major banks and their affiliation with the Supreme Leader, the IRGC, and other regime agencies

	BANK NAME	AFFILIATION	NO. OF COMPANIES OWNED BY BANK	NO. OF BRANCHES
1	KESHAVARZI (AGRICULTURE)	GOVERNMENT	7	1928
2	SEPAH	GOVERNMENT	4	1754
3	POST BANK	GOVERNMENT	1	406
4	MELLI (NATIONAL)	GOVERNMENT	26	3325
5	EXPORTS DEVELOPMENT OF IRAN (TOSE'E SADERAT-E IRAN)	GOVERNMENT	5	40
6	INDUSTRY AND MINING (SAN'AT VA MA'DAN)	GOVERNMENT	8	62
7	COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT (TOSE'E TA'AVON)	GOVERNMENT	4	466
8	MASKAN (HOUSING) BANK	GOVERNMENT	26	1281
9	REFAH KARGARAN (WORKERS' WELFARE) BANK		3	1035

	BANK NAME	AFFILIATION	NO. OF COMPANIES OWNED BY BANK	NO. OF BRANCHES
10	EQTESAD-E NOVIN (NEW ECONOMY) BANK		12	262
11	PARSIAN BANK	AFFILIATED WITH AUTO MANUFACTURERS WHOSE MAJORITY SHARES ARE OWNED BY SETAD AND THE IRGC	17	293
12	KAR-AFARIN (ENTREPRENEURSHIP) BANK	SETAD (KHAMENEI)	7	106
13	SAMAN (PROSPERITY) BANK		9	142
14	PASARGAD BANK	IRGC IS A SHAREHOLDER	68	327
15	SARMAYEH (CAPITAL) BANK		4	153
16	SINA BANK	MOSTAZAFAN FOUNDATION	3	242
17	SHAHR (CITY) BANK	TEHRAN MUNICIPALITY	14	261
18	DEY BANK	SHAHID FOUNDATION	13	91
19	KHAVARMIANEH (MIDDLE EAST) BANK		5	13
20	ANSAR BANK	IRGC	9	626
21	SADERAT (EXPORTS) BANK	IRGC IS A SHAREHOLDER	10	2706
22	MELLAT (PEOPLE) BANK	KHAMENEI'S SETAD IS A SHAREHOLDER	16	1592
23	GARDESHGARI (TOURISM) BANK	AHMADINEJAD FACTION	4	87
24	QAVAMIN BANK	STATE SECURITY FORCES (NAJA)	6	721
25	TEJARAT (COMMERCE) BANK	MAIN SHAREHOLDERS ARE THE IRGC AND THE ASTAN-E QODS FOUNDATION	21	2092
26	IRAN ZAMIN		5	356
27	AYANDEH (FUTURE) BANK			165
28	IRAN AND VENEZUELA BANK			
29	HEKMAT IRANIAN BANK	THE ARMY	2	128
30	MEHR IRAN BANK			547
31	RESSALAT BANK	SALEHIN ECONOMIC GROUP		233

List of publications

List of Publications by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, U.S. Representative Office



A Little Prince in the Land of the Mullahs

June 2019, 114 pages


The true story of a teenager who stood up to the mullahs' regime in Iran, recalled in the words of his surviving sister and told through drawn pictures. Ahmad, the hero of this story, was killed in 1988 at the age of 24, while in captivity but the perpetrators of the murder remain in key positions of power in Iran.



Iran's Emissaries of Terror

June 2019, 208 pages

This book explains the extent to which Tehran's embassies and diplomats are at the core of both the planning and execution of international terrorism targeting Iranian dissidents, as well as central to Tehran's direct and proxy terrorism against other countries.



Iran Doubles Down on Terror and Turmoil


November 2018, 63 pages

This book examines the regime's political and economic strategy, which revolves around terrorism and physical annihilation of opponents. Failing to quell growing popular protests, Tehran has bolstered domestic suppression with blatant terrorism and intimidation.




Iran Will Be Free:
Speech by Maryam Rajavi
September 2018, 54 pages

Text of a keynote speech delivered by Mrs. Maryam Rajavi on June 30, 2018, at the Iranian Resistance's grand gathering in Paris, France explaining the path to freedom in Iran and what she envisions for future Iran.




Iran's Ballistic Buildup: The March Toward Nuclear-Capable Missiles
May 2018, 136 pages

This manuscript surveys Iran's missile capabilities, including the underlying organization, structure, production, and development infrastructure, as well as launch facilities and the command centers. The book exposes the nexus between the regime's missile activities and its nuclear weapons program, including ties with North Korea.




Iran: Cyber Repression: How the IRGC Uses Cyberwarfare to Preserve the Theocracy
February 2018, 70 pages

This manuscript demonstrates how the Iranian regime, under the supervision and guidance of the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), have employed new cyberwarfare and tactics in a desperate attempt to counter the growing dissent inside the country.



Iran: Where Mass Murderers Rule: The 1988 Massacre of 30,000 Political Prisoners and the Continuing Atrocities
November 2017, 161 pages


Iran: Where Mass Murderers Rule is an expose of the current rulers of Iran and their track record in human rights violations. The book details how 30,000 political prisoners fell victim to politicide during the summer of 1988 and showcases the egregious political extinction of a group of people.



Iran's Nuclear Core: Uninspected Military Sites, Vital to the Nuclear Weapons Program

October 2017, 52 pages


This book details how the nuclear weapons program is at the heart of, and not parallel to, the civil nuclear program of Iran. The program has been run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) since the beginning, and the main nuclear sites and nuclear research facilities have been hidden from the eyes of the United Nations nuclear watchdog.



Terrorist Training Camps in Iran: How Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Trains Foreign Fighters to Export Terrorism

June 2017, 56 pages


The book details how Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps trains foreign fighters in 15 various camps in Iran to export terrorism. The IRGC has created a large directorate within its extraterritorial arm, the Quds Force, in order to expand its training of foreign mercenaries as part of the strategy to step up its meddling abroad in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, Afghanistan and elsewhere.



Presidential Elections in Iran: Changing Faces; Status Quo Policies

May 2017, 78 pages


The book reviews the past 11 presidential elections, demonstrating that the only criterion for qualifying as a candidate is practical and heartfelt allegiance to the Supreme Leader. An unelected vetting watchdog, the Guardian Council makes that determination.



The Rise of Iran's Revolutionary Guards' Financial Empire: How the Supreme Leader and the IRGC Rob the People to Fund International Terror

March 2017, 174 pages


This study shows how ownership of property in various spheres of the economy is gradually shifted from the population writ large towards a minority ruling elite comprised of the Supreme Leader's office and the IRGC, using 14 powerhouses, and how the money ends up funding terrorism worldwide.



How Iran Fuels Syria War: Details of the IRGC Command HQ and Key Officers in Syria

November 2016, 74 pages


This book examines how the Iranian regime has effectively engaged in the military occupation of Syria by marshaling 70,000 forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and mercenaries from other countries into Syria; is paying monthly salaries to over 250,000 militias and agents to prolong the conflict; and divided the country into 5 zones of conflict, establishing 18 command, logistics and operations centers.



Nowruz 2016 with the Iranian Resistance: Hoping for a New Day, Freedom and Democracy in Iran

April 2016, 36 pages


This book describes Iranian New Year, Nowruz celebrations at the Washington office of Iran's parliament-in-exile, the National Council of Resistance of Iran. The yearly event marks the beginning of spring. It includes select speeches by dignitaries who have attended the NCRIOUS Nowruz celebrations.



The 2016 Vote in Iran's Theocracy: An analysis of Parliamentary & Assembly of Experts Elections

February 2016, 70 pages


This book examines all the relevant data about the 2016 Assembly of Experts as well as Parliamentary elections ahead of the February 2016 elections. It looks at the history of elections since the revolution in 1979 and highlights the current intensified infighting among the various factions of the Iranian regime.



IRAN: A Writ of Deception and Cover-up: Iranian Regime's Secret Committee Hid Military Dimensions of its Nuclear Program

February 2016, 30 pages


The book provides details about a top-secret committee in charge of forging response to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of Tehran's nuclear program, including those related to the detonators called EBW (Exploding Bridge Wire), an integral part of developing an implosion type nuclear device.



Iranian Regime's Nuclear Duplicity: An Analysis of Tehran's Trickery in Talks with the P 5+1

January 2016, 74 pages


This book examines Iran's behavior throughout the negotiations process in an effort to inform the current dialogue on a potential agreement. Drawing on both publicly available sources and those within Iran, the book focuses on two major periods of intense negotiations with the regime: 2003-2004 and 2013-2015.



Key to Countering Islamic Fundamentalism: Maryam Rajavi? Testimony To The U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee

June 2015, 68 pages

Testimony before U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee's subcommittee on Terrorism, non-Proliferation, and Trade discussing ISIS and Islamic fundamentalism. The book contains Maryam Rajavi's full testimony as well as the question and answer by representatives.



Meet the National Council of Resistance of Iran

June 2014, 150 pages

Meet the National Council of Resistance of Iran discusses what NCRI stands for, what its platform is, and why a vision for a free, democratic, secular, non-nuclear republic in Iran would serve world peace.



How Iran Regime Cheated the World: Tehran's Systematic Efforts to Cover Up its Nuclear Weapons Program

June 2014, 50 pages

The monograph discusses the Iranian regime's report card as far as it relates to being transparent when addressing the international community's concerns about the true nature and the ultimate purpose of its nuclear program.

About the NCRI-US

The National Council of Resistance of Iran-US Representative Office (NCRI-US) acts as the Washington office for Iran's parliament-in-exile, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, which is dedicated to the establishment of a democratic, secular, non-nuclear republic in Iran.

NCRI-US, registered as a non-profit tax-exempt organization, has been instrumental in exposing the nuclear weapons program of Iran, including the sites in Natanz, and Arak, the biological and chemical weapons program of Iran, as well as its ambitious ballistic missile program.

NCRI-US has also exposed the terrorist network of the regime, including its involvement in the bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the Jewish Community Center in Argentina, its fueling of sectarian violence in Iraq and Syria, and its malign activities in other parts of the Middle East.

Our office has provided information on the human rights violations in Iran, extensive anti-government demonstrations, and the movement for democratic change in Iran.

Visit our website at www.ncrius.org

You may follow us on  @ncrius

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You can also find us on  NCRIUS

In Their Own Words...

Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, November 26, 2019: “We were engulfed in a more serious crisis in five provinces... On Saturday, incidents and clashes erupted in 100 locations in Tehran... More than 50 law-enforcement, military, and security bases were attacked. Some 500 were moving on the state radio and television, but our forces thwarted them.”

Mojtaba Zolnour, Chairman of Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, November 24, 2019: These people were well-trained. They came in 4 to 8-person teams and had a mission... On Sunday, November 17, we had 147 clashes just in Tehran... Throughout the country, we had 800 clashes in just one day, forcing us to divide the strength of our forces. They were well-trained.”

Hossein Naqavi, Majlis (Parliament) National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, November 25, 2019: “Over the past two years, the MEK trained different groups and circles, and directed them in the protests. These will not be the final incidents and we may be witness to similar ones.”

Yadollah Javani, IRGC’s Deputy for Political Affairs, November 29, 2019: “These [protests] - so widespread and so extensive - were unprecedented in the 40-year history of the Islamic Revolution. What happened in the final days of Aban (mid-November) was a far-reaching, new phenomenon.”

Mullah Ali Akbari, Tehran’s Friday prayer leader, November 29, 2019: “They have spent a lot of money, provided precise training and logistical support. It was, in their own words, the result of two years of extensive organizational work, identifying (targets), training, equipping and arming...”

Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, November 24, 2019: “These people were connected to governments and the [MEK]... I believe 34 MEK members have been arrested so far. A vast network of individuals, operating not under the MEK’s name, but pursuing their line and modus operandi were also identified.”

Khamenei’s representative in Gilan province, Rasoul Falahati, November 20, 2019: “We know that you (protestors) are the children of the executed MEK members. You are the children of the MEK in exile. ... We know who you are...”



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