



Open-Source Report on Fabricated “Mind-Control” Document Circulated by Iranian Regime Proxies Abroad

Brussels, November 2025

Introduction:

A document titled “The Use of ‘Destructive Mind Control’ Patterns in the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI/MEK) and Their Impact on Human Rights – Case Study: Mr. Ehsan Bidi” was circulated among Members of the European Parliament, and lawmakers and government officials elsewhere in Europe and the United States.

Issued in October 2025 by an obscure individual named Pouya Ahmadi, this document represents yet another instance of the Iranian regime’s long-running disinformation and smear campaign against its principal democratic opposition. Cloaked in a pseudo-academic façade and couched in the language of human rights — including references to international instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) — it purports to offer an objective analysis, while in reality, its case study concerns one of the most notorious agents of the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS/VEVAK). The International Committee In Search of Justice (ISJ) had long ago exposed this individual’s dubious nature and duly informed relevant United Nations bodies and Albanian authorities.

More importantly, the timing of this report’s release is no coincidence. It comes amid escalating unrest inside Iran, the reimposition of international sanctions, European governments’ deliberations over designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization, and Western capitals’ reassessment of their policies toward an increasingly fragile and unstable regime, with growing attention to the prospects of a post-theocracy alternative. Regardless of its hollow and repetitive content, the timing of its publication alone clearly exposes its true intent.

Tired Playbook: Decades of ‘Mind Control’ Propaganda Against the PMOI

Since the early 1990s, the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) has used the term “destructive mind control” to demonize the PMOI and intimidate its supporters. This notion has no basis in science or academia; it originated in MOIS training manuals that misappropriated Western sociological terminology about cults for political use.

he was provided with an official Iranian passport (No. 16359072) valid for five years, a clear proof that he was not a refugee. Using this passport, he traveled from Baghdad to Iran for training and new operational instructions.

As discussions about the transfer of PMOI members to Albania became serious in mid-2012, the regime sent Bidi back to Iraq to be transferred to Albania under the UN's humanitarian resettlement plan, posing as one of the Ashraf residents. This move, assisted by the Iraqi government, faced strong protests from the Ashraf residents and their representatives at the time. Unfortunately, he was transferred to Albania in October 2013.

Following the 1 September 2013 massacre at Camp Ashraf, during which Iran's Quds Force and Iraqi Interior Ministry special forces attacked Ashraf, killing 52 PMOI members and taking seven hostages (including six women), Bidi and several other regime agents wrote a "thank-you letter" to then-Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, praising his "decisive action" against the MEK and declaring their readiness to "cooperate" in the "liberation" of other members.²

In Albania, Bidi quickly came under the control of MOIS operatives in Tirana. He coordinated closely with Fereydoun Zandi Aliabadi, an MOIS officer stationed at the Iranian Embassy. Zandi had been dispatched to Albania following the start of the PMOI's relocation there with three missions:

- (1) Collect intelligence on residents of Ashraf 3;
- (2) Recruit defectors for MOIS operations; and
- (3) Spread false propaganda against the MEK to sway Albanian public opinion.

Bidi operated within a cell of MOIS agents including [Hassan Heyrani](#), [Gholamreza Shekari](#), [Daniel Kasraei](#), under the supervision of the Iranian Embassy in Tirana. The MOIS even dispatched its veteran operatives [Masoud Khodabandeh](#) and [Anne Singleton](#) from London to Albania to assist this network.

According to Hadi Sani Khani (who later defected from the network and exposed its details in a letter to the UN Secretary-General and in a published book), Bidi received about €1,000 per month, while his subordinates were paid €300–€500 monthly by the MOIS for espionage, recruitment, and online activities.³

² Iran-Efshagari, "Ehsan Bidi, An Operative for the Mullahs' Intelligence Station in Albania (Original in Farsi), December 12, 2013. https://iran-efshagari.com/احسان_بیدی_یادوی_ایستگاه_اطلاعاتی_آخوندها_در_آلبانی_مجاهدین_خلق_وزارت_اطلاعات_-_ایران_افشاگر

³ "Unmasking Details on Demonization Campaign, Espionage, Terrorist Plots by the Iranian Regime's Ministry of Intelligence, Embassy in Albania," NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee,

When Bidi's communications with the Iranian Embassy and Ministry of Intelligence became known to Albanian security and intelligence agencies, he was arrested in 2019 and transferred to a closed refugee detention facility. Following further investigations, on 17 October 2020, the Albanian Ministry of Interior issued a deportation order, declaring him a *persona non grata*⁴ due to his activities against national security in coordination with Iranian intelligence. This measure was based on a judicial and not an administrative decision. Previously, Albania's Top Channel TV had reported that Bidi was "recognized as a dangerous individual and had been spying on behalf of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence."⁵

After his attempts to move to other European countries failed, the regime was forced to return him to Iran. To conceal his safe return and whitewash his background, the Iranian state media published contradictory narratives, including the claim that he had been "arrested upon entering Iran." This was an obvious attempt to hide his prior collaboration with the Ministry of Intelligence.

The life trajectory of Ehsan Bidi reveals one of the propaganda and psychological mechanisms the Iranian regime uses against the Iranian Resistance. His name and statements against the PMOI are repeatedly echoed in MOIS-affiliated media outlets such as [Iran-Interlink](#), [The Nejat Society](#), and [The Edalat Society](#) — websites that Western security agencies⁶ have identified as tools of Tehran's propaganda and influence operations.

In March 2025, another individual, Abdulrahman Mohammadian, who had overseen regime agents in Albania carrying out activities against the MEK for several years, exposed the operations and plots by MOIS and the regime's embassy against the PMOI in Albania, echoing what Sani Khani had written about four years earlier. In a letter to the UN Secretary-General, he wrote:

"In November 2018, through Ehsan Bidi and Hassan Heyrani—whom I later discovered were actively collaborating with the Iranian regime—I requested a meeting with the Iranian embassy to arrange my return to Iran. In February 2019, Hassan Heyrani informed me that the embassy had instructed me to maintain

February 17, 2021. <https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/ncri-statements/unmasking-details-on-demonization-campaign-espionage-terrorist-plots-by-the-iranian-regimes-ministry-of-intelligence-embassy-in-albania/>

⁴ "Albania Arrests Iran Spy," Iran News Update, October 22, 2020.

<https://irannewsupdate.com/news/iranian-opposition/albania-arrests-iran-spy/>

⁵ Top Channel TV, Albania, July 22, 2020. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oO1qmVBV1Sw>

⁶ U.S. Library of Congress, *Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile* (2012).

<https://irp.fas.org/world/iran/mois-loc.pdf>.

contact through him and Ehsan Bidi and carry out tasks assigned by them. Initially, Hassan Heyrani paid me €300 monthly; later this amount increased to €500 per month. From then onward, I cooperated with individuals linked to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) and embassy who were paid for spreading propaganda against PMOI. The Iranian embassy instructed its operatives in Tirana to produce at least four articles each month defaming PMOI... Initially, Ehsan Bidi was tracking and collecting articles written on behalf of the embassy.”⁷

In this letter, Mohammadian referred to several staged events for journalists from Der Spiegel, BBC Persian, the New York Times, and Le Monde:

“In February 2020, they brought in a New York Times reporter for an interview. The topic of the conversation with this reporter was focused on the internal relations of the PMOI and its undemocratic nature, and the people had to state the dictated contents of the regime’s Ministry of Intelligence as a witness and what pressures were imposed on them. I also spoke with this reporter. The newspaper quoted me as saying: ‘Little by little, you break down. You forget yourself and your personality changes. You just follow orders. You are no longer yourself. You are just a machine...’ The truth is that everything I said to the New York Times was a lie. During my time with the PMOI, no-one ever asked me to tweet 10 times or 5 times for Mr. Giuliani or Bolton. The above sentences were clichés that the embassy had obligated us to say.”⁸

Independent verifications that debunk the Ahmadi narrative

Two primary sources of the Ahmadi document are outdated sources such as Human Rights Watch (2005) and RAND (2009), both of which pre-date the MEK’s relocation to Albania by at least 16 years and have since been thoroughly discredited.

When derivative allegations surfaced in the Human Rights Watch May 2005 (based on telephone interviews with 12 “former members”), the European Parliament dispatched an investigative mission to Camp Ashraf in July 2005. They privately interviewed MEK residents for days and issued a 132-page report, “People’s Mojahedin of Iran – Mission Report,” September 2005 (*Armatan Publishing*, Paris; English/French/Swedish), which refuted the claims repeated today.

⁷ “Enlightening Letter of an MOIS Agent, Six Years of Cooperation with the Iranian Regime’s Ministry of Intelligence, MOIS, in Albania, March 11, 2015. <https://iranprobe.com/enlightening-letter-of-mois-agent>

⁸ Patrick Kingsley, “Highly Secretive Iranian Rebels Are Holed Up in Albania. They Gave Us a Tour, *The New York Time*, February 17, 2020. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/16/world/europe/iran-mek-albania.html>

At the same time, the U.S. officer in charge of Ashraf's security, Brig. Gen. David Phillips (Commander, 89th MP Brigade, 2004–2005), wrote to HRW's Kenneth Roth (27 May 2005), a letter later published in the Congressional Record (21 June 2005):

"Over the year-long period I was apprised of numerous reports of torture, concealed weapons and people being held against their will... I personally led inspection teams on unannounced visits... At no time... did we ever discover any credible evidence supporting the allegations... Each report of torture, kidnapping and psychological deprivation turned out to be unsubstantiated. I observed a total freedom of choice on the part of the members to either remain or depart..."

The primary author of a 2009 RAND Corporation study, [Jeremiah Goulka](#), lacked expertise on the MEK, and the report was overseen by (the now deceased) [James Dobbins](#), who, as a former US Special Representative for Afghanistan, was a staunch advocate of the policy of appeasing the Iranian regime.

The report's underlying objective was to erode Fourth Geneva Convention protections for Ashraf residents, to pave the way for transferring their protection to the Iranian regime's puppet government in Iraq — a transfer whose consequences, in which the RAND report played a major role, were catastrophic: 177 MEK residents were killed in that period (including 27 deaths from medical blockades, the rest from military incursions by the Iraqi army and IRGC's Qods Force as well as missile attacks by the Iranian regime's Iraqi proxies) and 1,500 wounded (hundreds maimed), and nine hostages abducted, their fate still unaccounted for. This was while the Red Cross and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees had already warned about the consequences of transferring the protection of Ashraf to the Iraqi government.

Critically, what the Ahmadi document omitted was the detailed, 132-page rebuttal by Executive Action (Washington, DC), [Courting Disaster: How a Biased, Inaccurate RAND Corporation Report Imperils Lives, Flouts International Law and Betrays Its Own Standards](#), published on 1 January 2010.

Western intelligence documentation about MOIS campaigns targeting the PMOI

The use of the misleading label "*former members*" to fabricate "testimonies" against the opposition has long been recognized. In their annual or special reports, intelligence services in Europe and the United States have repeatedly highlighted the Iranian regime's intelligence services demonization campaign, especially by the MOIS, against the PMOI and the NCRI. [Germany's Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution \(BFV\)](#), [the Dutch intelligence service \(AIVD\)](#), and the report, entitled, "[Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile](#)," prepared by the Federal Research Division of Library of Congress commissioned at the request of the U.S. Department of Defense, have warned that the Iranian regime was intensifying its influence operations in Europe

through “ostensibly independent organizations and individuals who present themselves as human-rights activists.” The Ahmadi report fits precisely into this pattern

In its 1999 annual report, BfV wrote:

“In its fight against the Iranian opposition-in-exile, VEVAK makes use of so-called ‘culture associations’. These are cover organizations founded as directed by VEVAK and acting in accordance with Iran’s interests and wishes. In addition, the Iranian service initiates anti-MEK publications which in part are published by former MEK activists and have the aim of persuading the readers of these publications to turn their backs upon this organization.

“For spying on the MEK, the Iranian intelligence service also recruits supporters of that organization and other Iranian nationals. Recruitment mostly takes place during visits by exiled Iranians to Iran. When in that country, they will be approached by VEVAK and, in instances, under threat of massive harassment against themselves or their relatives in Iran, are compelled to cooperate with the intelligence service.”

Five years later, in its annual 2004 report that was released in [May 2005](#), the BfV added:

“The VEVAK is particularly interested in the People's Mujahidin of Iran (Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, MEK) and in its political arm, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) For its spying activities, the Iranian intelligence service relies on a network of secret agents who are recruited from among the supporters of the organizations and groups under VEVAK surveillance. In most cases, recruitment pitches are made when target persons are on a visit to Iran. During such approaches, the service puts pressure on the targeted persons, e.g. by threatening them with reprisals on their relatives living in Iran. Persons who do not travel to Iran are contacted over the telephone from Iran.”

And just two years ago, in 2023, BfV emphasized the focus of the Iranian regime’s intelligence services on the PMOI and the NCRI, underscoring that these services focus on recruiting “former members.”

In its annual Report in 2011, the General Intelligence and Security Service in the Netherlands, [AIVD](#), wrote:

“Teheran’s efforts to undermine the opposition People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (Mujahedin-e Khalq, MEK) in the Netherlands continued unabated in 2011. In a campaign coordinated and financed by

the Iranian intelligence services, the media and a number of politicians and other public servants were approached with a view to portraying the MEK in a highly negative light.”

In its 2012 report the [AIVD](#) stressed:

“The Iranian government is still active in its fight against the opposition movement Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MKO [PMOI]). It has emerged that the Iranian intelligence service manages a European network that is also active in the Netherlands. This network is made up of former MKO members recruited by the Iranian intelligence service. They have been given the task of negatively influencing public opinion about the MKO through lobbying, publications and anti-MKO meetings. They also collect information about the MKO and its (suspected) members for the Iranian intelligence service.”

And a December 2012 report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service, commissioned by the U.S. Department of Defense's Counterterrorism Division, entitled, “[Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile](#),” stated:

“MOIS uses its (PMOI’s) former members and/or people willing to cooperate with the ministry. They are sent to prison temporarily and become known as activists opposed to the Islamic Republic. After some time, no one questions their previous political activities; being a political prisoner is enough to be acknowledged as an opposition figure. Activists abroad may help get such a prisoner out of the country with the assistance of an international organization, or MOIS may send the prisoner abroad, calling him/her an ‘escaped dissenter.’”

Additional first-hand assessments of Ashraf

Following his 2003 visit to Camp Ashraf, the late [Rt. Hon. Lord Slynn of Hadley](#) (Lord of Appeal in the Ordinary; former Advocate General of the European Court of Justice; KBE) stated:

“What is to be found in Ashraf is a way of life with a commitment to democracy and to peace... Ashraf is not the world of a militant mob or a terrorist gang. It is a world of dedicated people led by a woman of great commitment and great distinction.”

In October 2008, a European parliamentary delegation, headed by [Prof. Alejo Vidal Quadras](#), at the time EP’s Vice President and now the ISJ President, visited Camp Ashraf and conducted extensive, private meetings across Ashraf’s facilities., had this to say to thousands of Ashraf residents upon departure:

“Ashraf city is a symbol of hope, of democracy, of freedom, of dignity, and of justice for the people of Iran and for all the peoples of this planet.”

The Ahmadi paper also ignores subsequent, decisive court ruling in the [United Kingdom](#), the [European Union](#), and the [United States](#), which annulled the terrorist designations, affirming the MEK’s lawful status; French courts described PMOI’s activities as “resistance against tyranny.”

The author’s depiction of Ashraf-3 in Albania, nestled in the heart of Europe, is as far removed from reality as its portrayal of Ashraf in Iraq. These findings are consistent with [dozens](#) of visits by [lawmakers](#), [current](#) and [former government officials](#) to Ashraf-3 (Albania) over the past six years, which have observed free movement, voluntary association, and ordinary civic life.

Indeed, no credible UN, EU, US or Albanian inquiry has ever corroborated the regime’s stock claims of “forced celibacy,” “internal prisons,” “mind control, or “confession rituals” within the PMOI.

Conclusion

The Ahmadi document and similar dossiers do not constitute genuine human rights reporting; they are state-directed influence operations aimed at shielding Tehran from accountability and undermining engagement with Iran’s organized democratic opposition. Accordingly, European institutions should reject anonymous, unsolicited, or unsubstantiated submissions, impose measures against embassy-linked interference, and uphold engagement with credible Iranian actors who advocate democracy, gender equality, the rule of law, and a free Iran. Furthermore, the European Union should implement targeted safeguards to prevent the Iranian regime from disseminating propaganda within EU institutions and distorting policy assessments regarding the Iranian opposition. Specifically, they should undertake the following measures:

Policy Implications for the EU

1. **Source Verification:** Vet unsolicited “human rights” documents of uncertain origin with national and EU security services before they circulate within EU institutions.
2. **Humanitarian Vetting:** Integrate counter-intelligence screening into asylum and relocation programs where hostile state actors may exploit humanitarian channels.
3. **Embassy-Front Monitoring:** Enforce financial transparency and staff vetting for embassy-linked cultural or media entities, and act swiftly on non-compliance.

4. **Media Due Diligence:** Encourage outlets to disclose sourcing and funding—especially when citing “former members” whose narratives mirror MOIS tradecraft documented by the BfV and AIVD.
5. **Intelligence Coordination:** Deepen EU–Albania cooperation and maintain structured dialogue with credible Iranian democratic actors to distinguish fact from state-sponsored fiction.

Prof. Alejo Vidal-Quadras

President, International Committee in Search of Justice (ISJ)

Struan Stevenson

Chair, Human Rights Committee, ISJ

Paulo Casaca

Member of the Executive Board, ISJ

About ISJ: International Committee In Search of Justice (ISJ) was initially formed in 2008 as an informal group of EU parliamentarians to seek justice for the Iranian democratic opposition. In 2014 it was registered as a non-profit NGO in Brussels expanding its membership beyond elected parliamentarians to former officials and other dignitaries with an interest to promote human rights, freedom, democracy, peace and stability. **P:** ISJ, Rue d’Arlon 63, B-1040 Brussels
T: +32 2 400 1071

E: Directorate@isjcommittee.com - Secretariat@isjcommittee.com **W:** isjcommittee.com